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A R T I C L E S

Legal Pathways
for a Massive
Increase in
Utility-Scale
Renewable
Generation
Capacity
by Michael B. Gerrard
Michael B. Gerrard is Andrew Sabin Professor of
Professional Practice and Director of the Sabin Center
for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School;
Chair of the Faculty of Columbia’s Earth Institute; and
Senior Counsel to Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer.

Summary
Decarbonizing the U.S. energy system will require a program of building onshore wind, offshore wind, utility-scale
solar, and associated transmission that will exceed what has
been done before in the United States by many times, every
year out to 2050. These facilities, together with rooftop
photovoltaics and other distributed generation, are required
to replace most fossil fuel generation and to help furnish
the added electricity that will be needed as many uses currently employing fossil fuels (especially passenger transportation and space and water heating) are electrified. This
Article, excerpted from Michael B. Gerrard & John Dernbach, eds., Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the
United States (ELI Press forthcoming 2018), discusses the
four most important legal processes and obstacles involved
in this enormous project: site acquisition and approval; the
National Environmental Policy Act; state and local approvals; and species protection laws. It also presents recommendations for lowering the obstacles and briefly discusses
several corollary actions that are needed.

I.

Achieving the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project
(DDPP) scenarios1 to decarbonize the U.S. energy system
will require a program of building onshore wind, offshore
wind, utility-scale solar,2 and associated transmission that
is not only unprecedented—it will exceed what has been
done before in the United States by many times, every year
out to 2050.
This Article will discuss the four most important legal
processes and obstacles involved in this enormous project:
site acquisition and approval; the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA); state and local approvals; and species
protection laws. It will also present recommendations for
lowering the obstacles, and it will briefly discuss several
corollary actions that are also needed.
These problems are not unique to the United States. A
2016 study from the International Energy Agency found
that large renewable projects in France, Norway, and the
United Kingdom have also been plagued in varying degrees
by delays from political/regulatory issues, site access, environmental approvals, and grid connection.3
Approval delays are costly in several ways. Construction costs may escalate. New technologies or requirements may compel a revision in designs, leading to
further delays. Applicants may become so discouraged by
the delays that they give up, or their financing may vanish, or local opposition to siting may grow. Lenders who
require speedy returns may be deterred from engaging at
all. During the years that a renewable facility is not yet
operating, the energy needs it will fill may be provided
by fossil fuel facilities that add to the cumulative load of
greenhouse gases.
After quantifying the number of facilities needed, this
Article discusses each of the four principal processes in
turn. First, however, it is appropriate to introduce NEPA,4
since it is so pervasive in what follows. NEPA requires fedAuthor’s Note: The author thanks the following reviewers for their
comments on earlier drafts: David Cleaves, John Dernbach, David
Hayes, Michael Hindus, Ryan Jones, Yael Lifshitz, Ethan Shenkman,
Eleanor Stein, and Edward Strohbehn.
1.
2.

3.

4.
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Introduction

The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project is a global consortium of
researchers working on practical methods to deeply reduce greenhouse gas
emissions in their own countries. See http://deepdecarbonization.org/.
Utility-scale facilities are typically stand-alone and are designed to provide
power to the electric grid. They are in contrast to distributed facilities,
which are often attached to buildings and are designed to help power those
buildings and perhaps the immediate community, though they sometimes
sell excess power to the grid.
International Energy Agency’s Implementing Agreement for
Renewable Energy Technology Deployment, Final Report:
Documenting the Cost of Regulatory Delays (Re-Delays) (2016),
available at http://iea-retd.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RE-DELAYSfinal-report.pdf.
42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.
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eral agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement
(EIS) for any major federal action significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment. Utility-scale projects on federal land, or offshore, almost invariably require
an EIS. The NEPA process can go on for several years and
cost millions of dollars, and it often leads to litigation that
can take still more years.
As discussed below, recent legal and administrative reforms have shown promise in shortening NEPA
time lines and reducing litigation for renewable energy
projects, but the field remains challenging. Several
related actions may be considered together in a “programmatic” EIS, sometimes (but not always) followed
by narrower site-specific EIS or environmental assessments; this “tiering” process has the potential to reduce
duplicated effort.5
It must also be noted that the Donald Trump Administration is moving to rescind a large number of environmental regulations and guidance documents, especially those
adopted during the Barack Obama Administration. The
Trump Administration is clearly very favorable toward fossil fuel development; its attitudes toward renewable energy
development remain to be seen. Readers are cautioned to
ensure that any federal regulations or orders referenced
here are still in effect.

II.

Table 1
U.S. Net Electricity Generation6
Thousands Megawatt (MW) Hours
Year

Wind

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

26,589
34,450
55,363
73,886
94,652
120,177
140,822
167,840
181,655
190,719
226,485

Solar PV
Solar Thermal Solar PV
Utility Scale Utility Scale Distributed
15
493
N/A
16
596
N/A
76
788
N/A
157
735
N/A
423
789
N/A
1,012
806
N/A
3,451
876
N/A
8,121
915
N/A
15,250
2,441
11,233
21,666
3,227
14,139
33,367
3,388
19,467

In 2016, wind and solar amounted to 6.9% of U.S.
electricity generation.7 By 2050, this will need to go up
to 50.25% under the DDPP Mixed Scenario and 78.0%
under the DDPP High Renewables Scenario, as shown in
Tables 2 and 3.8
Table 2
Percentage of U.S. Electricity Generation—
DDPP Mixed Scenario

The Massive Number of
Needed Facilities

The DDPP scenarios all call for the construction of a
massive number of new central station renewable energy
facilities, mostly wind and solar—many times higher
than the amount of such construction ever previously
achieved. These are required to replace most fossil fuel
generation and to help furnish the added electricity that
will be needed as many uses currently employing fossil
fuels (especially passenger transportation and space and
water heating) are electrified. (Some of this needed capacity could be met instead by small-scale distributed units,
mostly rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal.) All of this is in addition to aggressive programs of
energy efficiency and, possibly, expanded use of nuclear
energy and hydropower.
The amount of energy produced in the United States
from wind and solar sources has been rapidly increasing, as
shown in Table 1.

7-2017

Year
2016*
2020
2030
2040
2050

Onshore Wind
5.50
8.41
18.09
27.04
31.56

Offshore Wind
0
0.03
1.38
4.44
7.59

Solar PV
1.30
0.62
1.11
3.27
11.10

* Actuals9

Table 3
Percentage of U.S. Electricity Generation—
DDPP High Renewables Scenario
Year
2016*
2020
2030
2040
2050

Onshore Wind
5.50
9.57
26.14
45.30
51.57

Offshore Wind
0
0.03
4.28
7.18
10.89

Solar PV
1.30
1.12
4.64
7.93
15.54

* Actuals

6.	
5.	

40 C.F.R. §1508.28. This was successfully done by the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) in the Dry Lake, Nevada, solar energy zone. Because
of the programmatic EIS for the zone, three large projects were able to move
forward in less than 10 months under tiered environmental assessments. Press
Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Interior Department Approves First
Solar Energy Zone Projects (Apr. 26, 2016), available at https://www.doi.gov/
pressreleases/interior-department-approves-first-solar-energy-zone-projects.

7.	
8.	
9.	

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Electric Power
Monthly With Data for February 2017 tbls. 1.1 and 1.1.A (2007)
[hereinafter Electric Power Monthly], available at https://www.eia.gov/
electricity/monthly/pdf/epm.pdf.
Id.
Source: Personal Communication with Ben Haley, DDPP (Aug. 29, 2016).
Source of actuals: Electric Power Monthly, supra note 6, tbls. 1.1 and
1.1.A. Excluded is the very small amount of electricity generated by the
Rhode Island offshore wind facility that opened on Dec. 12, 2016.
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Tables 1, 2, and 3 show electricity generation—the electricity that is actually generated. The amount of new generating capacity added each year—the amount of electricity
that could be generated if the units were running all the
time—has fluctuated considerably for wind (not solar), due
mostly to the expiration and renewal cycles for federal tax
credits. This is shown in Table 4.
Table 4
U.S. Renewable Energy Nameplate
Net Capacity Added (MW)10
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Onshore Wind
372
2,396
2,454
5,237
8,425
9,919
5,112
6,649
13,089
1,102
4,772
8,113

Solar PV*
58
79
105
160
298
382
852
1,925
3,372
4,761
6,247
7,260

* Grid connected only; reported in MW direct
current (MWdc)

The amounts of new generation capacity added each
year under the DDPP Mixed Scenario and DDPP High
Renewables Scenario are presented in Tables 5 and 6.11 As
these tables show, the amount of new capacity that will
need to be added each year must be many times higher
than what has been achieved in prior years.
Table 5
Annual Capacity Additions (MW)—
DDPP Mixed Scenario
Year
2014*
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050

Onshore Wind
4,772
9,606
16,448
23,689
26,551
27,863
18,137
13,913

Offshore Wind
0
333
1,689
3,682
7,921
8,728
17,485
12,273

Solar PV
6,201**
1,294
3,996
10,788
12,149
15,092
20,524
42,857

* Actuals
** Grid connected only

10. U.S. Department of Energy, National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
2015 Renewable Energy Data Book 22 (2016), available at http://www.
nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/66591.pdf.
11. Source: Personal Communication with Ben Haley, DDPP (Aug. 26, 2016).
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Table 6
Annual Capacity Additions (MW)—
DDPP High Renewables Scenario
Year
2014*
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050

Onshore Wind
4,772
10,462
29,813
39,625
61,343
66,584
54,105
51,305

Offshore Wind
0
304
4,770
14,323
2,606
0
20,532
13,578

Solar PV
6,201**
1,311
7,040
19,074
20,379
24,751
40,331
66,502

* Actuals
** Grid connected only

Table 7 compares the electric generating capacity from
wind and solar PV that actually existed in 2016 to what
is projected for 2050 under the DDPP Mixed and High
Renewables Scenarios; the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA’s) 2017 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO)
reference case (which assumes that the statutes and regulations of 2016 remain in place, that known technologies
will improve, and that economic and demographic trends
continue); and the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s)
Wind Vision report. The table starkly shows the order of
magnitude-scale increases that will be needed over current
capacity, and the large increases needed beyond DOE’s
projections for 2050.
Table 7
U.S. Electric Generating Capacity (MW)
Scenario
2016 actual
2050: DDPP Mixedb
2050: DDPP High
Renewables
2050: EIA AEO 2017
reference casec
2050: DOE Wind
Visione

Onshore
Wind
81,260
725,382
1,373,372

Offshore
Wind
30 a
186,802
313,208

Solar PV

156,300

30,000

148,000d

318,000

86,000

19,380
488,539
800,267

—

a. Deepwater Wind, Block Island Wind Farm, http://dwwind.com/project/
block-island-wind-farm/ (last visited May 1, 2017).
b. The DDPP figures were derived from printouts depicting annual
capacity additions under each scenario, provided by Ben Haley of
Evolved Energy Research. The figures represent capacity additions
for 2015 through 2050. The table assumes that all the capacity that
existed prior to 2015 is retired by 2050, and it does not assume any
other retirements.
c. EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2017—Table: Renewable Energy Generating
Capacity and Generation [hereinafter Annual Energy Outlook 2017 Table],
http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=16-AEO2017&c
ases=ref2017&sourcekey=0 (last visited May 1, 2017).
d. This figure does not include off-grid PV.
e. DOE, Wind Vision : A New Era for Wind Power in the United States
xxxiii, fig. ES.1-3 (2015) (DOE/GO-102015-4557) [hereinafter DOE,
Wind Vision].
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III. Site Acquisition and Approval
Large solar and wind projects require a considerable
amount of land.12 When land that is suitable for a large
facility is privately owned and its owner is willing to sell
or lease, few novel legal issues arise. This is a conventional
real estate transaction, though for large projects, it may
be necessary to acquire title or easements from multiple
landowners, which can lead to difficult negotiations and
sometimes holdout problems. However, three important
kinds of sites invoke complicated legal processes that can
engender years of delays: federal land, especially the vast
tracts in the western deserts that could accommodate large
solar arrays; offshore areas, which have enormous potential
for wind farms; and contaminated or otherwise disturbed
land. This section describes the legal issues for these kinds
of sites, together with recommendations.

A.

Federal Land

The federal government controls vast amounts of
land. The process for designating some of this use for
utility-scale wind and solar projects has been complex
and lengthy.
Most pertinently here, the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), part of the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI),
controls approximately 248 million surface acres of federal
land, nearly all of it located in 11 western states and Alaska.
The U.S. Forest Service, part of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, controls 193 million surface acres of forests
and grasslands, primarily in western states and Alaska, but
also throughout the country.13 BLM has identified 20.6
million acres of its land with wind potential, and 19 million with solar potential.14 The Forest Service, while not
adding up the acreage, has identified 99 National Forest
Units with potential for wind, solar, or both.15
Efforts to site wind and solar facilities on federal lands
emerged, at first slowly, in the 2000s. In May 2001, President George W. Bush issued an Executive Order directing
federal agencies “to take appropriate actions, to the extent
consistent with applicable law, to expedite projects that
12. See Paul Denholm et al., National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
Land-Use Requirements of Modern Wind Power Plants in the
United States (2009) (NREL/TP-6A2-45834); Sean Ong et al.,
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Land-Use Requirements
for Solar Power Plants in the United States (2013) (NREL/TP6A20-56290); Vasilis Fthenakis & Hyung Chui Kim, Land Use and
Electricity Generation: A Life-Cycle Analysis, 13 Renewable & Sustainable
Energy Revs. 1465 (2009); Nathan F. Jones & Liba Pejchar, Comparing the
Ecological Impacts of Wind and Oil & Gas Development: A Landscape Scale
Assessment, 8 PLoS ONE 1 (2013).
13. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Renewable Energy:
Agencies Have Taken Steps Aimed at Improving the Permitting
Process for Development on Federal Lands 4 (2013) (GAO-13-189)
[hereinafter GAO, Renewable Energy Report].
14. BLM, Renewable Energy: New Energy for America, https://www.blm.gov/
programs/energy-and-minerals/renewable-energy (last visited May 11,
2017).
15. U.S. Forest Service & National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
Assessing the Potential for Renewable Energy on National Forest
System Lands (2005) (NREL/BK-710-36759).
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will increase the production, transmission or conservation of energy.”16 However, the order did not distinguish
between fossil and renewable energy. In 2002, BLM issued
an interim wind energy policy,17 and in 2005, it issued a
programmatic EIS on wind development, as further discussed below. In 2004 and 2007, BLM issued policies on
solar development.18 BLM has also taken other actions on
geothermal energy.19
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 devoted one sentence to
the subject:
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Interior
should, before the end of the 10-year period beginning on
the date of enactment of this Act, seek to have approved
non-hydro-power renewable energy projects located on
the public lands with a generation capacity of at least
10,000 megawatts of electricity.20

However, the U.S. Congress did not confer any additional authority on BLM, or alter the approval procedures
that BLM must use.
By the time Obama became president in January 2009,
BLM had approved only 566 MW of wind generation
and no solar energy projects on public lands.21 However,
in March 2009, his Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar,
issued a Secretarial Order establishing renewable energy
development as a priority for DOI. Secretary Salazar
implemented a series of permitting reforms to improve and
accelerate the review and permitting process for utilityscale projects on public lands.22 The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the stimulus legislation)
played an important role by providing expanded tools
to help renewable energy developers obtain financing for
their projects.
As a result of these efforts, BLM achieved the Energy
Policy Act of 2005’s goal of authorizing more than 10,000
MW of renewable energy on public lands in 2012, three
16. Exec. Order No. 13212, 66 Fed. Reg. 28357 (May 22, 2001), Actions to
Expedite Energy-Related Projects.
17. Instruction Memorandum No. 2003-020 from BLM, to All Field Officials,
on Interim Wind Energy Development Policy (Oct. 16, 2002), available at
http://windeis.anl.gov/documents/docs/IM2003-020,InterimWindEnergy
DevelopmentPolicy.htm.
18. Instruction Memorandum No. 2005-006 from BLM, to All Field Officials,
on Solar Energy Development Policy (Oct. 20, 2004), available at https://
www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/archive/news/archive/04_News_Releases/
solar.pdf; Instruction. Memorandum No. 2007-097 from BLM, to All Field
Officials, on Solar Energy Development Policy (Apr. 4, 2007), available at
https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2007-097.
19. See BLM Geologist Sean Hagerty, Presentation at Geothermal Energy
Leasing on BLM Managed Lands, Geothermal Resource Council 2014
Pre-Meeting Workshop (Sept. 24, 2014), https://geothermal.org/Annual_
Meeting/PDFs/1%2009.55%20%20Leasing%20of%20Federal%20Lands.
%20HAGERTY,%20BLM.pdf.
20. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §211, 199 Stat. 594.
21. Jennifer A. Diouhy, Obama Rule Could Take Wind Out of Renewable Power
on Public Land, Bloomberg Markets, Aug. 22, 2016, https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-22/obama-rule-could-take-windout-of-renewable-power-on-public-land.
22. See David J. Hayes et al., Stanford Law School, A 21st Century
Governance Challenge: Finding Effective Mechanisms to Address
Climate Change Across the Federal Government 40-55 (2015),
available at https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/
04/SLS-Climate-Chg-Governance-Report.pdf.
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years ahead of schedule.23 As of December 2016, BLM had
approved 30 solar projects, of which 11 were in operation
and seven were under construction; and it had approved 11
wind projects, of which four were in operation.24 A number of DOI’s permitting reforms were then adopted by the
Obama Administration and, importantly, codified in law
under the FAST Act, discussed below.
The future is uncertain. President Obama’s Climate
Action Plan called for the permitting of at least 20,000
MW on public lands by 2020.25 Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign posted a position paper pledging to
“reform leasing and expand clean energy production on
public lands and waters tenfold within a decade.” During
his campaign, Trump strongly favored new infrastructure
construction, but appeared to be much more favorable to
fossil fuels than renewables, and he expressed some antagonism to wind projects. On March 28, 2017, President
Trump issued an Executive Order rescinding the Climate
Action Plan.26
As of December 2016, approximately 5,000 MW of
wind and solar capacity operate on public lands.27 (There
was one facility in the water—the Rhode Island project
discussed below.) At that time, the total amount of wind
capacity in the United States (on all kinds of land) was
81,260 MW; the total amount of solar PV was 19,380
MW.28 How will we get to the 912,184 MW total wind
that the DDPP reports indicated will be needed by 2050
in the Mixed Scenario, and the 1,686,580 MW total wind
in the High Renewables Scenario (recognizing that much
of this will be on private land)?
The needed increases in renewable generation may
require—and would certainly be helped by—changes in
the legal model for making public land available.
Special statutory leasing processes exist for oil and gas
production, and for geothermal production. In 2005, Congress mandated special environmental review and leasing
processes for oil shale and tar sands.29 However, Congress
has adopted no special rules for wind or solar siting on federal lands. Instead, wind and solar siting on BLM land is
covered by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
23. Hearing on S.279, Public Land Renewable Energy Development Act of 2013,
Before the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee 1 (2004) (testimony
of Neil Kornze, Director, BLM).
24. BLM, Renewable Energy Data, https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-andminerals/renewable-energy/data (last visited May 11, 2017).
25. Executive Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action
Plan 7 (2013), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.
26. Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
27. Calculated from the maximum capacity of all the facilities listed as operational,
plus the 566 MW listed as having been approved prior to 2009, on this
website as viewed in December 2016: http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/
energy/renewable_energy/Renewable_Energy_Projects_Approved_to_Date.
html. This number may be high because it is not clear if all 566 MW of
the capacity approved prior to 2009 was actually built, or whether all the
approved units have been built to full capacity. (Author’s Note: It has not been
possible to update these figures because when the BLM website was checked
on April 9, 2017, it was no longer available.)
28. Annual Energy Outlook 2017 Table, supra Table 7, note c. The solar PV figure
does not include off-grid PV, which is not reported.
29. Oil Shale, Tar Sands, and Other Strategic Unconventional Fuels Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §1169, 119 Stat. 594, 728.

47 ELR 10595

(FLPMA),30 first enacted in 1976. Specifically, under Title
V of FLPMA, permits to lease BLM land for wind or solar
purposes are treated as linear rights-of-way, based on the
19th century practices for building roads and railways.31
These permits are temporary conveyances that may readily
be modified or terminated, and offer less security than the
leases held by oil, gas, and coal companies.
The Forest Service operates under the National Forest
Management Act (NFMA),32 which allows the Service to
grant “special use authorizations” for uses other than road
usage, grazing and livestock use, sale and disposal of timber and other forest products, and mineral usage.33 Among
the permitted authorizations are “permits, leases and easements . . . for rights-of-way for . . . systems and related
facilities for generation, transmission and distribution of
electric energy,”34 which would authorize wind or solar
generation facilities.
Both FLPMA and the NFMA require the agencies
to develop land use plans for the areas they manage. All
approved projects must be consistent with those plans,
and if they are not, the plans must be revised. Revising
the plans is an arduous process that requires compliance
with NEPA, among other laws. Each solar project has typically required its own EIS under NEPA, while some wind
projects merely require environmental assessments, which
tends to save more than one year.35
BLM has gotten much faster at navigating this process.
A 2013 study by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) found that solar and wind applications submitted in 2006 took an average of 3.9 years to process;
applications submitted in 2009 took 1.5 years.36
As noted above, Secretary Salazar instituted new environmental review procedures in 2009 that accelerated the
permitting of renewable energy projects on BLM lands.
DOI retooled an ongoing solar energy programmatic
EIS to institute additional permitting reforms through
its so-called Western Solar Plan. More specifically, BLM
developed a template in the programmatic EIS for “solar
energy zones” that, because of lessened environmental
conflicts and other attractive features (e.g., locations near
transmission), should be preferred for solar development.37
Applying the template, BLM identified 19 solar energy
zones encompassing 285,000 acres in Arizona, California,
Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah, and anticipated that more solar energy zones would be created in

30. 43 U.S.C. §§1701-1785.
31. Id. §§1761 et seq. See also Adam Vann, Congressional Research Service,
Energy Projects on Federal Lands: Leasing and Authorization
(2012) (7-5700), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40806.pdf.
32. 16 U.S.C. §§1600-1687.
33. 36 C.F.R. §251.50(a).
34. Id. §251.53(l)(4).
35. GAO, Renewable Energy Report, supra note 13, at 17-18.
36. Id. at 19.
37. David J. Hayes, Thinking Big, Envtl. F., Nov./Dec. 2013; BLM, Final Solar
Energy Development Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(2012), available at http://solareis.anl.gov/documents/fpeis/index.cfm.
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the future.38 It also amended 89 FLPMA land use plans to
allow solar projects.39
Several environmental groups challenged the EIS on the
grounds that there had been insufficient consideration of
distributed generation and of building on disturbed lands,
but the court upheld the EIS.40 Because this EIS looked
at the sorts of impacts a solar project could have in this
region, individual solar projects in one of the solar energy
zones did not require their own EIS, and they and associated transmission lines otherwise enjoyed expedited processing. (Outside of these zones, another 19 million acres
are designated as “variance areas”; projects there must go
through individual procedures.41) The first three projects
to go through the new process, all in the Dry Lake solar
energy zone in Nevada, got through the BLM process in
less than 10 months. BLM also required funding for longterm desert tortoise monitoring, post-construction monitoring of impacts on bird and bats, and measures to reduce
visual impacts.42
The process does not assure approval. In November
2014, BLM rejected an application to build a 200-MW
solar facility in the Mojave Desert, finding that the project
could disturb important natural and cultural resources.43
A somewhat similar process—which culminated with
a BLM record of decision in September 2016 after eight
years of work—was undertaken jointly by BLM, the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the state of California to develop the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan. It designated multiple uses and protections for
a 22.5-million area portion of the California desert. Of
this, 388,000 acres were designated for renewable energy
development—a far lower amount than the solar industry had sought.44 Solar developers may now apply to build
projects on this acreage.
BLM has made a bit less progress with wind than with
solar. In June 2005, BLM completed a programmatic EIS
for wind projects in the western states, and amended 52
38. BLM, Solar Energy Zones, http://blmsolar.anl.gov/sez/ (last updated Jan.
10, 2014); Breaking the Logjam at BLM: Examining Ways to More Efficiently
Process Permits for Energy Production on Federal Lands: Hearing Before the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 6 (2014) (testimony of
Arthur Haubenstock, Solar Energy Industries Association); David J. Hayes
& Nidhi Thakar, Center for American Progress, A 4-Point Plan for
Responsibly Expanding Renewable Energy Production on America’s
Public Lands and Oceans (2015), available at http://www.ourenergypolicy.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/RenewableEnergy-report1.pdf.
39. GAO, Renewable Energy Report, supra note 13, at 23.
40. Western Lands Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 13-cv-339, 44 ELR
20143 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 2014), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 802 (9th Cir. 2016).
41. Haubenstock testimony, supra note 38, at 6.
42. Scott Streater, Interior OKs First Solar Projects Through Streamlined Reviews,
E&E News, June 1, 2015.
43. Carolyn Whetzel, California Desert Solar Project Could Disturb Resources,
BLM Says in Rejecting Application, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Nov. 14,
2014, at A-5.
44. BLM, Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan Record of
Decision (2016) (BLM/CA/PL-2016/03+1793+8321), available at http://
www.drecp.org/finaldrecp/rod/DRECP_BLM_LUPA_ROD.pdf;
Chris
Mooney, The Government Just Decided the Future of California’s Desert,
and Solar Companies Aren’t Happy, Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 2016. See also
Nathaniel Logar, When the Fast Track Hits the Off Ramp: Renewable Energy
Permitting and Legal Resistance on Western Public Lands, 27 Colo. Nat.
Resources, Energy & Envtl. L. Rev. 361 (2017).
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FLPMA plans. It identified 20,634,000 acres as “potentially developable” for wind, but only 160,000 acres as
“economically developable,” based on access to and costs
of transmission capacity, the intermittency of wind power,
wind technology developments, and potential barriers to
wind resource development. The EIS did not map those
areas, and no wind energy zones have been designated.45
BLM has, however, proposed some wind development
areas in several resource management plans, which govern
particular BLM units.46
In December 2016, BLM issued its final rule to create
a competitive lease process for solar and wind energy on
federal land.47 It favors development in “designated leasing
areas” with high solar or wind resource value and low land
use conflicts. All the royalties go to the U.S. Treasury. Prior
to final issuance of the rule, the Solar Industries Association had said it would add “time, uncertainty, complexity,
and expense to a permitting process that is already substantially more difficult to pursue than permitting on private
lands.”48 Tension also emerged between those who want
to make sure the federal government gets a good financial
return on these leases, and those who argue that the rule,
while formalizing what had been informal procedures, will
increase the costs of building wind and solar facilities on
federal land. As this is written, controversy remains over
whether the rule on a net basis will help or hinder renewables development.
As it is, rents for fossil fuel leases on BLM land (which
are governed by the Mineral Leasing Act) are $2 per acre at
most, in contrast to the rents set by BLM for solar, which
are established according to a complex formula in the regulations and are much higher.49 On top of the rental cost,
royalties must be paid for fossil fuel production, but that
is based on actual production; wind and solar operators
must pay capacity fees regardless of actual production,
though the capacity factor for each type of energy source is
reflected in the rental rate.50
A bill to resolve some of these issues, the Public Lands
Renewable Energy Development Act, has been introduced in every Congress since 2011. It has attracted broad
45. DOI, BLM, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on
Wind Energy Development on BLM-Administered Lands in the Western
United States, (2005); see also Domenic A. Cossi, Getting Our Priorities
Straight: Streamlining NEPA to Hasten Renewable Energy Development on
Public Land, 31 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 149 (2010).
46. Nick Lawton, Promoting Renewable Energy Development on Public Lands,
Green Energy Inst., Nov. 14, 2014, at 22.
47. 81 Fed. Reg. 92122 (Dec. 19, 2016).
48. Quoted in Memorandum from Andrew Vecera, Majority Committee
Staff, to Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources Members, on
Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2663 (Rep. Paul Gosar, House Committee
Report 3-4 (July 11, 2016)).
49. 43 C.F.R. §2806.52.
50. Lawton, supra note 46, at 24; Susan Kraemer, BLM Charges Exorbitant Rent,
Fees for Solar, Energy Storage Compared to Fossil Fuels, Renewable Energy
World, Nov. 24, 2015; Competitive Processes, Terms, and Conditions
for Leasing Public Lands for Solar and Wind Energy Development and
Technical Changes and Corrections, 79 Fed. Reg. 59023, 59033 (proposed
Sept. 30, 2014); Competitive Processes, Terms, and Conditions for Leasing
Public Lands for Solar and Wind Energy Development and Technical
Changes and Corrections for 43 C.F.R. Parts 2800 and 2880, 81 Fed. Reg.
92122 (Dec. 19, 2016).
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bipartisan support. In the fall of 2016, it was part of a
comprehensive energy bill being advanced by Sen. Lisa
Murkowski (R-Alaska), but the bill was not enacted before
the end of the 114th Congress. The bill would apply to all
BLM and national Forest Service lands that have not been
excluded from solar or wind energy development by prior
plans, and would require evaluation of other U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Agriculture lands for
suitability for renewables. Programmatic EIS would be
utilized to expedite project review. High-level interagency
coordination would be required—something that all agree
is important.
Rather than all the royalty revenue going to the Treasury, the bill would allocate 25% to the states, 25% to the
counties, 35% to a Renewable Energy Resource Conservation Fund, and 15% to the Treasury for use in assisting in
the processing of renewable energy permit applications.51
This 35% allocation to a conservation fund to help restore
and protect fish and wildlife habitat and related projects
has earned the bill the support of the Wilderness Society,
Trout Unlimited, the Natural Resources Defense Council,
and other conservation and environmental groups. However, the wind and solar industries are still unhappy with
the requirement for competitive bidding and the requirement for royalty payments.52
In another action taken in the final weeks of the Obama
Administration, on December 22, 2016, BLM issued
policy guidance on mitigation measures that could be
employed in approving actions on public lands such as
construction of renewable energy projects.53 The policy
guidance followed previous mitigation reforms intended to
provide more certainty to developers, while also producing
better environmental results, when identifying compensatory mitigation measures required as part of the permitting
process.54 However, shortly after President Trump took
office, the new Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, issued
an order that “directs a reexamination of the mitigation
policies and practices across the Department of the Interior
. . . in order to better balance conservation strategies and
policies with the equally legitimate need of creating jobs for
hard-working American families.”55
Tribal lands also have tremendous potential for renewable energy. A 2013 study by DOE found that American
Indian land comprises approximately 2% of U.S. land, but
contains an estimated 5% of all renewable energy resources,
including about 14 billion megawatt-hours (MWh) of total
technical potential on tribal lands for electricity generation
51. Kornze testimony, supra note 23, at 4.
52. Haubenstock testimony, supra note 39, at 10-11; Jennifer A. Dlouhy,
Obama Rule Could Take Wind Out of Renewable Power on Public Land,
Bloomberg Markets, Aug. 22, 2016.
53. BLM, Manual §1794, Mitigation (2016); BLM, Mitigation Handbook
H-1794-1 (2016).
54. David J. Hayes, Addressing the Environmental Impacts of Large Infrastructure
Projects: Making “Mitigation” Matter, 44 ELR 10016 (Jan. 2014), available
at http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/docs/elr-na/44.elr_.10016.pdf.
55. Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3349, American Energy Independence
(Mar. 29, 2017), available at https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/
uploads/so_3349_-american_energy_independence.pdf.
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from utility-scale rural solar resources, about 1,100 MWh
from wind, and about 7 million MWh from hydropower.56 In 2015, the GAO found that energy development on
Indian lands has been hindered by poor management by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as by the complex
regulatory framework, tribes’ limited capital and infrastructure, and varied tribal capacity. This has led to missed
development opportunities, lost revenue, and jeopardized
viability of projects.57
Recommendations: The Western Solar Plan can serve as an
exemplar for what can be accomplished without new legislation. By undertaking an environmental review over a
large geographic area that included a detailed examination
of species presence and habitat, it satisfied the requirements
of both NEPA and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).58
(The ESA is discussed in more detail below.) This way, the
Western Solar Plan allowed individual projects within the
study area to proceed quickly. BLM should identify more
solar energy areas where this process could be utilized. The
Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan is another
example, though it took a long time to complete and designated only very limited areas for renewables. BLM has
also launched more than a dozen “rapid ecoregional assessments” that examine ecological conditions and trends in
large ecoregions.59 As noted below, BLM’s Planning 2.0
rule, designed to facilitate large-scale land use planning,
was annulled by Congress and President Trump in 2017.
This is a step backwards.
While BLM has made considerable progress in accommodating renewable projects on its land, the Forest Service
has made much less progress and should take steps to catch
up. The Forest Service has several policies in place promoting wind and solar projects, 60 and construction broke
ground in September 2016 on the first utility-scale project
actually to be built on its land, a 15-turbine wind project
in the Green Mountain National Forest in Vermont.61 (The
Forest Service does a great deal with biomass, but that is
beyond the scope of this Article.)
The Public Lands Renewable Energy Development Act
has been under consideration in Congress since 2011. It
would help encourage and expedite new renewable projects
on public lands, and something like it should be enacted.
In the deliberations over this bill, consideration should be
given to relaxation of the fair market value requirement
56. DOE, Office of Indian Energy, Developing Clean Energy Projects
on Tribal Lands: Data and Resources for Tribes 3 (2013), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/57748.pdf.
57. GAO, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S.
Senate, Indian Energy Development: Poor Management by BIA Has
Hindered Energy Development on Indian Lands (2015) (GAO-15502) [hereinafter GAO, Indian Energy Development Report], available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670701.pdf.
58. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544.
59. Id.; Hayes, supra note 54, at 10019.
60. See U.S. Forest Service, Special Uses-Energy, https://www.fs.fed.us/
specialuses/special_energy.shtml.
61. “Avangrid, Governor Shumlin Break Ground on Deerfield Wind Farm,”
Vermont Bus. Mag., Sept. 19, 2016, http://www.vermontbiz.com/news/
september/avangrid-governor-shumlin-break-ground-deerfield-wind-farm.
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when leasing federal lands for renewables, since such relaxation would add to the economic incentive to build such
facilities.62 This might result in a loss of federal revenues
(if enough projects that would have proceeded anyway are
able to enjoy the lower rents), but it would advance the
decarbonization objective.
DOI should carefully review and consider acting on
the GAO recommendations for improving the process
for approving renewable energy projects on tribal lands,
including changes to the processes for mapping lands, verifying ownership, tracking reviews, providing guidance to
tribes, and helping tribes eliminate capacity gaps.63

B.

Offshore Wind

Difficult as it has been to site renewable projects on federal
land, it has been even more difficult to do this offshore.
However, the first offshore wind project has finally begun
operation, and several more are in the pipeline.
The winds offshore tend to blow harder and more uniformly than the winds onshore. The potential energy produced from wind is directly proportional to the cube of
the wind speed. As a result, in addition to being less intermittent than onshore wind, the somewhat higher wind
speeds typical offshore can generate much more energy.
Most large population centers in the United States are near
coastlines, so offshore wind would not require nearly as
much new transmission capacity as onshore wind.64 The
total technical potential for offshore wind in the United
States—the amount of electricity that could be generated if
turbines were placed everywhere physically possible—has
been calculated as 4,200 gigawatts (GW),65 which is about
four times the current capacity of the U.S. grid.66 The wind
speeds are higher off the Pacific Coast than off the Atlantic
and Gulf Coasts, but the water off the Atlantic and Gulf
Coasts is much shallower, making the costs of offshore
installations there lower.67
Denmark installed the world’s first offshore wind project in 1991. Since then, 142 more have become operational
worldwide, with a total capacity of 13.9 GW. Another 34
are under construction with a capacity of 7.7 GW, and
142 have been approved, with a capacity of 44.5 GW.68
They are mostly in Europe, with some in China, Japan,
and South Korea. The total number of operational offshore
62. There is considerable precedent for relaxing the fair market value requirement
for certain favored uses on federal lands. See Pamela Baldwin, Fair
Market Value for Wind and Solar Development on Public Land 11
(Taxpayers for Common Sense & Wilderness Society Dec. 2010), available
at http://www.taxpayer.net/images/uploads/downloads/FMV_Report.pdf.
63. GAO, Indian Energy Development Report, supra note 57, at 36-38.
64. BOEM, Offshore Wind Energy, http://www.boem.gov/Offshore-WindEnergy/ (last visited May 1, 2017).
65. Anthony Lopez et al., National Renewable Energy Laboratory, U.S.
Renewable Energy Technical Potentials: A GIS-Based Analysis iv
(2012).
66. EIA, Electricity Generating Capacity, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/
capacity/ (last visited May 11, 2017).
67. But see International Renewable Energy Agency, Floating
Foundations: A Game Changer for Offshore Wind Power (2016).
68. The Wind Power, World Wind Farms Database, http://www.thewindpower.
net/store_continent_en.php?id_zone=1000 (last visited May 1, 2017).
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wind farms in the United States stood at zero until December 2016, when a very small facility (30 MW) started operations off Rhode Island. The best-known proposed project
in the United States is Cape Wind in Massachusetts; this
468-MW project was first proposed in 2001 and is still
struggling with approvals and financing. Its delays have
cast a pall over offshore wind in the United States. (The
Rhode Island and Cape Wind projects will be discussed in
more detail below.)
Many companies have attempted to build offshore wind
farms in the United States but have been discouraged or
blocked by regulatory fragmentation and confusion, shifts
in political support, high costs, and public opposition.
However, recent actions by the federal government and
some states, plus technological advances and falling costs
(though still much higher than onshore wind), coupled
with the 2015 extension of the production tax credit, portend a major expansion of offshore generation in the next
few years, at least where the coastal states strongly and consistently support it.
An extraordinary expansion will be needed. As shown
in Table 5, the DDPP Mixed Scenario contemplates the
construction of the equivalent of four Cape Wind-sized
facilities every year by 2025, eight every year by 2030, 17
every year by 2035, and 37 every year by 2045. The total
of 17.5 GW that would need to be added in 2045 alone
exceeds the 12.5 GW capacity of all the offshore wind turbines operating in the world today. Table 6 shows that the
DDPP High Renewables Scenario involves 20.5 GW being
added in 2045 alone.
The state governments play an important role with offshore facilities. The states control the underwater land out
to three nautical miles from shore69; beyond that, the federal government has control out to 200 nautical miles from
shore.70 (However, for historical reasons, Florida and Texas
control the seabed to about 10 nautical miles offshore in
the Gulf of Mexico.71) Wind farms more than three miles
offshore (as most of them would be)72 still need transmission lines running through state waters; and wind farms
less than three miles offshore are still subject to various
federal laws (discussed below). Moreover, the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA)73 provides for state review of
certain activities occurring solely in federal waters. This
means that every offshore wind farm needs both federal
and state approvals—and, in almost every case, multiple
approvals at each level of government.
Until 2005, the lead federal agency for offshore wind
had been the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps),
acting under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 shifted lead authority over all
69. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1311(a)(1).
70. Outer Continental Shelf Act, 43 U.S.C. §1302.
71. Ben Deninger, The Twenty-First Century Offshore Wind Boom: Why Texas Is
Leading the Way, 44 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 81, 91 (2014).
72. Timothy H. Powell, Revisiting Federalism Concerns in the Offshore Wind
Energy Industry in Light of Continued Local Opposition to the Cape Wind
Project, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 2023, 2029 (2012).
73. 16 U.S.C. §§1451-1466.
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offshore energy projects (including wind, but not including the Great Lakes) to the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Minerals Management Service, and
authorized it to issue leases, easements, and rights-of-way
for such projects. The Corps (as protector of navigation)
retained permitting authority over offshore construction,
and is still the lead federal agency for offshore wind energy
in the Great Lakes. In October 2007, the Minerals Management Service issued a programmatic EIS for alternative
energy development and production and alternative use of
facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf.74 In 2009, the
Minerals Management Service and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) resolved a long-standing
jurisdictional dispute and entered into a memorandum of
understanding that clarified that the Service has exclusive
jurisdiction over offshore wind energy. The Service then
issued detailed regulations for this program, providing for
competitive and noncompetitive leasing of offshore lands.75
In 2010, in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the
Minerals Management Service was broken into three parts;
one of them, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM), inherited the offshore wind leasing process.
In 2011, BOEM and DOE issued a “National Offshore
Wind Strategy,” which called for the deployment of 54 GW
of offshore wind generating capacity by 2030.76 (Under the
DDPP Mixed Scenario, 20 GW of offshore wind would be
added by 2030; under the DDPP High Renewables Scenario, the figure would be 64 GW.)
In April 2015, DOE issued its Wind Vision report, which
examined how wind could supply 10% of the nation’s electrical demand in 2020, 20% in 2030, and 35% in 2050. It
studied a scenario with 22 GW of offshore wind capacity
by 2030 and 86 GW by 2050.77
In September 2016, BOEM and DOE released a new
version of the National Offshore Wind Strategy. Among
the challenges it said would need to be overcome in order
to achieve the Wind Vision goals are reducing costs and
technology risks, and ensuring efficiency, consistency, and
clarity in the regulatory process.
Progress has been made on both of those fronts. As the
Wind Vision report documents, costs have declined significantly. In 2010, Secretary of the Interior Salazar launched
a “Smart From the Start” program to speed wind deployment off the Atlantic Coast. BOEM hopes that Smart
From the Start will reduce permitting time lines from the
expected 7-10 years to half that or less.78 Key elements of
that program include:

74. BOEM, Guide to the OCS Alternative Energy Final Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), at http://www.boem.gov/RenewableEnergy-Program/Regulatory-Information/Guide-To-EIS.aspx (last visited
May 11, 2017).
75. 30 C.F.R. pt. 585.
76. DOE, A National Offshore Wind Strategy: Creating an Offshore
Wind Energy Industry in the United States iii (2011) (DOE/
EE-0798).
77. DOE, Wind Vision, supra Table 7, note e, at xxxiii, fig. ES.1-3.
78. DOE, supra note 76, at 17.
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• Streamlining the approval process for individual proposed projects and eliminating unnecessary regulatory requirements.
• Implementing a comprehensive, expedited leasing
framework for offshore wind development by identifying so-called “wind energy areas” along the Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf that appear most suitable
for offshore wind energy development because of
fewer user conflicts and resource issues. Wind energy
areas have been identified through an interagency
process that gathered information regarding the environmental and geophysical attributes and other uses
of these wind energy areas. That data were assembled
in a publicly available format to help identify areas
for development. Relevant federal departments with
interests in the offshore areas were involved to reduce
conflicts (e.g., Department of Defense military training; Coast Guard navigation; National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration sensitive fishing
grounds). State and tribal officials in each of the relevant states were consulted to obtain their input prior
to the identification of wind energy areas.
• Moving aggressively on a separate but parallel track
to process any applications to build offshore transmission lines, such as a potential regional “backbone”
line that would serve multiple future offshore wind
projects along the Atlantic outer continental shelf.79
BOEM has designated 11 wind energy areas, where offshore areas will be leased for wind development.80 BOEM
has awarded commercial leases for all of them. The leases
could support a total of 14.6 GW of capacity.81 BOEM is
working to identify more areas. NEPA reviews are being
tied to these designations, and arrangements are being
made with other federal agencies and with the states in
order to smooth the processes. The Smart From the Start
program also involves a great deal of coordination on permitting; the National Offshore Wind Strategy declares:
Several federal entities also have mandates to review
and/or approve certain aspects of offshore wind projects,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency, Fish and
Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Department of
Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Defense, U.S. Coast
Guard, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Numerous state, local, and tribal government entities, as
well as other stakeholders, must also be consulted in the
permitting process. The mandates of these various enti79. DOE, supra note 76, at 13.
80. BOEM, Mid-Atlantic Wind Energy Areas, http://www.boem.gov/MidAtlantic-Wind-Energy-Areas/ (last visited May 11, 2017); BOEM, North
Atlantic Wind Energy Areas, http://www.boem.gov/North-Atlantic-WindEnergy-Areas/ (last visited May 11, 2017).
81. DOE & DOI, National Offshore Wind Strategy: Facilitating the
Development of the Offshore Wind Industry in the United States
(2016) (DOE/GO-102016-4866).
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ties include managing protected species, managing commercial and recreational fisheries, protecting marine and
coastal habitats, and designation and protection of marine
areas with special significance due to their conservation,
recreational, ecological, historical, scientific, cultural,
archeological, educational, or aesthetic qualities.82

The state role is strengthened by the CZMA. Under the
Act, states prepare coastal zone management plans. Once
a state plan has been approved by the Secretary of Commerce, all federal actions must be consistent with that plan,
subject to very limited exceptions.83
The difficulties in working with all these federal and state
agencies are highlighted by the tortuous path followed by
the Cape Wind project. After being proposed in 2001, the
project went through the NEPA process and obtained the
permits it needed from the Corps, but it had to mostly start
over when Congress shifted authority for offshore wind
to DOI in 2005. DOI prepared a new EIS and approved
the project in 2010. Other needed permits were issued in
2011. But the project was opposed by several prominent
and wealthy owners of property in Cape Cod, including
several members of the Kennedy family and one of the
Koch brothers, and numerous lawsuits were filed.84 Each
new approval provided the opportunity for a new lawsuit.
Among these were a suit by the Aquinnah Wampanoag
Tribe of Gay Head in Martha’s Vineyard, which claimed
that the project would disrupt views that are necessary for
their religious observances, and would violate their ancestral burial grounds85; and another seeking to overturn the
Federal Aviation Administration’s determination that the
project would not be a hazard to flight.
The developers estimated they spent more than $70
million fighting the regulatory and legal battles. They
seemed to have won them all, but in January 2015, the two
utility companies that had signed power purchase agreements to buy most of the power output, discouraged by the
lengthy delays, terminated the agreements.86 In July 2016,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit rejected most of the challengers’ latest claims, but
found that BOEM had violated NEPA by using inadequate
data about the seafloor and subsurface hazards, and must
supplement the EIS. The court also found that FWS had
erred in disregarding certain submissions before issuing an
approval under the ESA.87 Sixteen years after the project
was first proposed, its fate remains very much in doubt.
82. DOE, supra note 76, at 11 (abbreviations omitted).
83. 16 U.S.C. §1456. See also Jeffrey Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and
Burns: How Climate Change Urgently Requires a Paradigm Shift in the
Permitting of Renewable Energy Projects, 42 Envtl. L. 1101 (2012).
84. Katharine Q. Seelye, Koch Brother Wages 12-Year Fight Over Wind Farm,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 2013; Robert F. Kennedy Jr., An Ill Wind Off Cape
Cod, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2005.
85. Public Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d 67,
44 ELR 20058 (D.D.C. 2014).
86. Lawrence Susskind & Ryan Cook, The Cost of Contentiousness: A Status
Report on Offshore Wind in the Eastern United States, 33 Va. Envtl. L.J. 204,
219-21 (2015); Powell, supra note 72, at 2025-27.
87. Public Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, No. 14-5301 (D.C.
Cir. July 5, 2016).
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This Massachusetts saga is in stark contrast to what
has happened next door in Rhode Island.88 By the mid2000s, Rhode Island realized that it needed to expand its
production of renewable energy, and that offshore might
be a good place to do that. It conducted extensive studies of the offshore area, including marine ecology, climate, cultural and historical resources, fisheries, tourism,
and recreation. The state’s coastal regulator, the Coastal
Resources Management Council, hired the University of
Rhode Island to conduct the studies. They were utilized
in undertaking a program of marine spatial planning—
essentially, zoning the ocean to determine what sorts of
activities should take place where and when. Interests
that might otherwise be skeptical, including the fishing
industry, were brought in early.
This led to the creation of the Rhode Island Ocean
Special Area Management Plan (RI O-SAMP). Such
plans are authorized by the CZMA, but had not previously been employed to plan for wind energy. They also
tended to stop at the three-mile line; but the Coastal
Resources Management Council, acting in the absence of
a well-defined regulatory regime, went where the science
took it, and its plan crossed into federal waters. The plan
identified a site three miles southeast of Block Island as
best suited for wind turbines. It did not hurt that Block
Island is not connected to the mainland electric grid, and
relies on diesel fuel to generate electricity; thus, the wind
farm could lower Block Island’s high electric bills, and
the local government came to support the project (unlike
what had happened in Cape Cod).
The U.S. Department of Commerce, eager to advance
offshore wind, was receptive to this approach and accepted
the RI O-SAMP into the state’s coastal zone management plan. BOEM agreed to include the identified federal
waters in the relevant wind energy area and lease them for
offshore wind.
While all this was being done, the state issued a request
for proposals to identify a qualified company to build a
five-turbine 30-MW demonstration wind farm. The state
selected Deepwater Wind, which was able to rely on the
studies conducted by the state, and it agreed to reimburse
the state for the $3.2 million cost of the studies. Since the
studies had already been done, Deepwater Wind was able
to obtain the needed federal and state permits within two
years of applying.
Another element of this success was a power purchase
agreement that would assure Deepwater Wind of a market for its electricity at a price that allowed it to obtain
financing. With the strong support of the state’s governor and legislature, National Grid entered into a power
purchase agreement that some large ratepayers argued
was above market prices. The state public utilities commission rejected the agreement based on its high cost, but
88. This account of the events in Rhode Island is drawn from Michael Burger,
Consistency Conflicts and Federalism Choice: Marine Spatial Planning Beyond
the States’ Territorial Seas, 41 ELR 10602 (July 2011); John M. Boehnert, A
New Blueprint for Coastal Zone Management, 30 Nat. Resources & Env’t
52 (2016); Susskind & Cook, supra note 86.
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promptly afterwards, the legislature passed and the governor signed a law requiring the utility commission to
consider environmental and other issues. In view of the
project’s environmental benefits, the commission then
approved the agreement, and this approval was upheld by
both the Rhode Island Supreme Court89 and the U.S. District Court.90 The facility began operation in December
2016. It is the first offshore wind farm in the United States,
and, though it is small, it is being heralded as a model for
federal-state cooperation in building projects of this sort.
New York may not be far behind Rhode Island. Gov.
Andrew Cuomo has announced his strong support for a
wind farm off Long Island, and in September 2016, the
state released a “blueprint” for the New York State Offshore
Wind Master Plan, declaring that New York has 39 GW of
wind potential off its Atlantic Coast.91 BOEM has identified a wind energy area off Long Island, and in December 2016, Statoil ASA, a subsidiary of a Norwegian energy
company, won a BOEM auction to build a wind farm there
of about 800 MW.92 A coalition of fishing advocates, local
towns, and municipalities sued BOEM, claiming that an
EIS should have been prepared first. The U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia denied their motion for
a preliminary injunction blocking the lease sale.93
Several of the states along the eastern seaboard have
adopted statutory or regulatory programs to facilitate offshore wind, hoping the economic and political environments will become hospitable for such projects.94 In August
2016, Massachusetts enacted a law requiring electric utilities to acquire a combined total of 1,600 MW of electricity
from offshore wind; long-term contracts must be signed by
2027. However, this law was written to make Cape Wind
ineligible to participate in this program.95
On the other hand, in May 2016, New Jersey Gov.
Chris Christie vetoed a bill that would have advanced a
proposed wind farm off Atlantic City,96 amid charges from
the Sierra Club that he is “holding offshore wind hostage
to his national political ambitions.”97 A fellow Republican governor, Paul LePage of Maine, has been so cool to
89. In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482
(R.I. 2011).
90. Riggs v. Curran, No 15-342 (D.R.I. July 7, 2016).
91. New York State Energy Research and Development Authority,
Blueprint for the New York State Offshore Wind Master Plan
(2016).
92. Saqib Rahim & Daniel Cusick, New York: How Statoil Edged Out the State
on a Massive Bid, Energywire, Dec. 19, 2016. See also Philip E. Karmel et
al., The Proposed Wind Farm Off the Shore of Long Island, Envtl. L. N.Y.,
Sept. 2016.
93. Memorandum Opinion, Fisheries Survival Fund v. Jewell, No. 1:16-cv02409, 47 ELR 20026 (D.D.C. issued Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.eenews.
net/assets/2017/02/16/document_gw_01.pdf.
94. Katherine A. Roek, Offshore Wind Energy in the United States: A Legal and
Policy Patchwork, 25 Nat. Resources & Env’t 24 (2011).
95. Zahra Hirji, Massachusetts’ Ambitious Clean Energy Bill Jolts Offshore Wind
Prospects, Inside Climate News, Aug. 2, 2016; Bob Salsberg, 6 Things to
Know About Massachusetts’ New Energy Law, Boston.com, Aug. 13, 2016.
96. Joyce Hannon, Gov. Christie Vetoes Latest Offshore Wind Farms Bill, Law360,
May 2, 2016.
97. Jeff Tittel, Christie Made NJ a Loser on Offshore Wind, Daily J., Aug. 25,
2016; R. William Potter, Opinion: Candidate Christie’s Fateful About-Face on
Wind Power, NJ Spotlight, June 29, 2016.
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offshore wind that a Norwegian company that had been
poised to build there withdrew.98 For the Great Lakes,
where BOEM has no jurisdiction, one commentator has
written that without modifications to the coastal zone
management process (which does apply):
[S]tates may be reluctant to proceed, leaving them unprepared to face the headwinds that lie ahead. The snarled
web of regulatory authorities, acts, and regulations must
be sorted out now so that when the technological and
infrastructural challenges are worked out, offshore deployment can take off in smooth, charted waters.99

Texas has a strong renewable portfolio standard, a tradition of permitting energy projects with relatively light
environmental regulation, and control of the waters of
the Gulf of Mexico beyond 10 nautical miles. It seemed
poised to build offshore wind, but what may have been
the most promising developer withdrew in 2013; Texas
has by far the greatest amount of onshore wind power
in the United States, and its cost is much lower than offshore facilities.100
Recommendations: BOEM should continue its designation
of wind energy areas, and prepare programmatic EIS to
expedite approval of projects in those areas. The most recent
BOEM auction for offshore wind areas, held in December
2016 for a site off Long Island, New York, attracted six serious bidders and was won by a Norwegian-based company,
Statoil.101 This is one indication of considerable commercial
interest in building such facilities.
In the first months of the Trump Administration,
BOEM conducted an auction for offshore wind for
water off Kitty Hawk, North Carolina; a Spanish-based
company won. BOEM also announced it plans to stage
another competitive lease auction in New England waters,
triggered by unsolicited applications for the same area by
Statoil and a German company.102 These sorts of actions
should continue.
Major federal facilities on the coastlines, such as large
naval bases, should consider committing to purchasing power from offshore wind facilities. Power purchase
agreements would considerably help project developers
secure financing.
98. Maine Governor: Wind Power Is Too Expensive, Seacoastonline.com, Apr.
4 2015; Susskind & Cook, supra note 86, at 226.
99. Sarah Schenck, Maneuvering the Headwinds Facing Offshore Wind
Development in the Great Lakes: Amending the Coastal Zone Management Act,
98 Minn. L. Rev. 2479, 2510 (2013/2014). See also Ashlyn N. Mausolf,
Clearing the Regulatory Hurdles and Promoting Offshore Wind Development
in Michigan, 89 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 223 (2012).
100. Kent Harrington, Texas Is Giving Away Wind Energy, ChEnected, Nov.
30, 2015; Mark Del Franco, Offshore Wind Developer Baryonyx Pulls Plug on
GoWind Demonstration Project, N. Am. Windpower, June 5, 2014; Anthony
V. Bova, What’s the Holdup? How Bureaucratic Obstacles Are Undercutting the
True Potential of American Wind Power, 46 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 571, 593
(2013); Deninger supra note 71, at 91-94.
101. Diane Cardwell, Off Long Island, Wind Power Tests the Waters, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 2017.
102. Derrick Z. Jackson, Made in America: Trump Embracing Offshore Wind?, Daily
Climate, Apr. 3, 2017, http://www.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2017/
april/made-in-america-trump-embracing-offshore-wind/.
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Congress should instruct reviewing agencies that
unavoidable visual and aesthetic impacts do not provide a
basis for denying wind energy permits. There appears to be
little evidence that offshore wind projects seriously impair
property values, and even if they did, the decarbonization
objective should take precedence.
Congress could include preference for offshore renewable energy projects in the CZMA consistency process.103
This would make it more difficult for reluctant states to
disapprove these projects should that issue arise.
States with offshore wind capacity should develop and
implement processes to promptly review and act upon
applications for offshore wind projects.

C.

Disturbed Land

Contaminated sites, old mining areas, and closed landfills
provide potential places to build solar or wind facilities.
The land is typically inexpensive, and its owners are often
happy to realize a little income—or even have someone else
take it off their hands—if this use allows them to avoid the
great expense of cleaning it up so that it can be suitable for
residential use.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has established the RE-Powering America’s Land Initiative to encourage and facilitate such actions. It reports
that nearly 180 installations of renewable energy have
been built on these sites, with a cumulative installed
capacity of just over 1,124 MW.104 As part of this program, EPA has developed an online mapping tool that
has preliminarily screened more than 80,000 sites on
more than 43 million acres for solar, wind, biomass, and
geothermal potential.105
On December 5, 2013, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum, Presidential Leadership on Energy
Management, that not only directed all federal agencies
to obtain 10% of their yearly electricity from renewable
resources by 2015 and 20% by 2020, but also directed that
“[a]gencies shall consider opportunities to the extent economically feasible and technically practical, to install or
contract for energy installed on current or formerly contaminated lands, landfills, and mine sites.”106
One of the principal impediments stems from the fact
that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) makes anyone
who assumes ownership or operation of a contaminated
site potentially liable for its cleanup.107 EPA insists that it
will ordinarily not take enforcement action against renew103. Thaler, supra note 83, at 1148.
104. U.S. EPA, RE-Powering Accomplishment Highlights, https://www.epa.gov/
re-powering/re-powering-accomplishment-highlights (last updated Nov. 1,
2016).
105. U.S. EPA, Developing Mapping and Screening Tools—RE-Powering Mapper,
https://www.epa.gov/re-powering/re-powering-accomplishment-highlights#
highlight_1 (last updated Nov. 1, 2016).
106. Charles B. Howland, Brightfields: Sustainable Opportunities for Renewable
Energy Projects on Environmentally Impaired Lands, 29 Nat. Resources &
Env’t 41 (2014).
107. 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675, §9607 (CERCLA §107).
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ables developers who build on contaminated land, and in
July 2014, it issued its Liability Reference Guide for Siting
Renewable Energy on Contaminated Properties. Several
states have enacted laws encouraging the reuse of disturbed
land for renewable projects.108 However, many developers
and their lenders remain skittish, in the absence of a more
legally binding assurance of no liability, even though the
actual risks are very modest.109
Several other developments are easing the way to finding
sites for renewable energy facilities. The Federal Highway
Administration is encouraging the use of highway rightsof-way for siting such facilities.110 California has adopted a
statute making it easier to use otherwise-restricted agricultural lands that have “severely adverse soil conditions” or
“significantly reduced agricultural productivity” for renewable energy facilities.111 Some farmers have found that it is
more lucrative to lease certain land for renewable facilities
than to grow crops there.112
In one particularly ambitious effort, in 2016, the Conservation Biology Institute and the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law published a study of land
(most of it privately owned) in California’s San Joaquin
Valley where a collaborative process involving multiple
stakeholders determined that solar PV could be sited with
minimum conflicts with agriculture, species habitat, and
other conservation concerns. Out of 9.5 million acres in
the study area, 470,000 acres of land were identified, theoretically capable of providing 94,000 MW—greater than
all combined in-state generation capacity.113
Recommendations: Congress could provide a liability
exemption under CERCLA for the developers of renewable
energy facilities on contaminated land, assuming they have
followed specified standards and procedures.
States could adopt similar liability exemptions for
renewable energy facilities under their own laws on contaminated land liability.
Other states could adopt laws similar to California’s law
encouraging renewables development on disturbed agricultural land.
States should conduct surveys to determine what disturbed lands (and other privately owned lands) would be
suitable for renewable energy facilities.
108. Amy Morris et al., Green Siting for Green Energy, 5 J. Energy & Envtl. L.
17 (2014).
109. Peter Trimarchi, Structured Approach Can Help Solar Developers Fulfill
Promise of Brownfields, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Oct. 17, 2013, at B-1.
110. Federal Highway Administration, Renewable Energy Generation
in the Highway Right-of-Way (2016) (FHWA-HEP-16-052), available
at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/climate_change/mitigation/
publications/row/renewablerow.pdf.
111. 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 596; see also Amy Odens, A New Crop for Agricultural
Land: The Renewable Energy Mandate and Its Potential to Turn Farm Lands
Into Energy Fields, 44 McGeorge L. Rev. 1037 (2013).
112. Joe Ryan, Harvesting Sunshine More Lucrative Than Crops at Some U.S.
Farms, Env’t Rep. (BNA), Mar. 31, 2016, at A-9.
113. Dustin Pearce et al., University of California, Berkeley, Law School
& Conservation Biology Institute, A Path Forward: Identifying the
Least-Conflict Solar PV Development in California’s San Joaquin
Valley (2016), available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/05/A-PATH-FORWARD-May-2016.pdf.
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NEPA

As noted above, large projects needing federal approvals, or federal onshore or offshore land, typically require
an EIS under NEPA. Some states have their own impact
assessment laws (“little NEPAs”) that require EIS for
state- or locally approved projects that are not undergoing EIS under NEPA. Many of the studies, hearings, and
other processes involved in project approval are subsumed
within the federal or state EIS processes, so while the EIS
is being prepared, many other necessary tasks are being
accomplished; delays should not be attributed entirely (or
even mostly) to the EIS process.114 But the NEPA and little
NEPA processes can be extremely time-consuming and, as
discussed below, several actions have been taken to speed
up the processes, and more can be done.
An annual survey found that for federal EIS made
available in 2014, there was an average of 1,709 days
(4.7 years) between the issuance of the notice of intent
to prepare an EIS and the issuance of the final EIS. Of
the agencies most heavily involved in renewable energy
projects, the average time for FERC was 1,201 days
(with a range from 938 days to 2,985 days); for BLM,
the average was 1,423 days (with a range from 839 days
to 2,590 days).115
This does not span the full time between proposal
and final construction approval; it takes at least months
and sometimes years before a project reaches the point
that an agency will issue a notice to prepare an EIS, and
once the final EIS is complete, more months or years can
pass until all permits are issued and construction may
begin. Actual building also takes time, of course; one
study found that for wind and solar projects, two to four
years typically lapse between the start of construction
and commercial operation.116
Project developers have long bemoaned delays caused by
NEPA and the little NEPAs, and there have been many
calls to reform and shorten the processes. The Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) has performed numerous
studies with this aim.117 Improvements were made around
the edges, but the most important change did not occur
until December 2015.
As a lead-up to this, in 2010, DOI issued an order establishing a new interagency approach to facilitate permitting decisions for the siting and development of renewable
114. Linda Luther, Congressional Research Service, The Role of the
Environmental Review Process in Federally Funded Highway
Projects: Background and Issues for Congress 2-5 (2012); GAO,
National Environmental Policy Act: Little Information Exists on
NEPA Analyses 18-19 (2014) (GAO-14-369).
115. Piet deWitt & Carole deWitt, Preparation Times for Environmental Impact
Statements Made Available in 2014, in Annual NEPA Report 2014, at 8
(Karen Johnson ed., National Association of Environmental Professionals
2015).
116. Steve Pociask & Joseph P. Fuhr Jr., U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Project No Project: Progress Denied: A Study on the Potential
Economic Impact of Permitting Challenges Facing Proposed
Energy Projects 9 (2011).
117. E.g., CEQ, Modernizing NEPA Implementation (2003).
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energy projects on public lands.118 This order proposed early
collaboration inside and outside government, set schedules
and monitored compliance with them, and added resources
to the review process. All this helped reduce the time for
processing solar and wind energy permits from an average
of four years to one-and-a-half years.119
On August 31, 2011, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum calling on federal agencies to expedite the review of high-priority infrastructure projects.
This led to the creation of the Federal Infrastructure Projects Permitting Dashboard, which tracked the permitting
of approximately 50 selected major highway and transit
projects. The dashboard was designed to provide greater
transparency into agency decisionmaking by publicly
announcing and tracking important NEPA milestones.
On March 22, 2012, the president took further action
by signing Executive Order No. 13604, Improving Performance of Federal Permitting and Review of Infrastructure
Projects. It established a steering committee comprising
deputy secretaries or their equivalents from the 12 federal agencies most likely to be involved in infrastructure
projects, charged with identifying best practices for infrastructure permitting and review. The steering committee
issued its report in June 2012 and eventually developed the
Implementation Plan for Modernizing Infrastructure Permitting. The White House developed the Federal Plan for
Modernizing the Federal Permitting and Review Process
for Better Projects, Improved Environmental and Community Outcomes, and Quicker Decisions, followed by an
implementation plan that the steering committee issued in
May 2014.
In 2015, Sens. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Claire
McCaskill (D-Mo.) introduced the Federal Permitting
Act, which adopted many of the recommendations that
grew out of the process just described. That bill was folded
almost entirely into the transportation appropriations
bill as Title XLI, Federal Permitting Improvement. On
December 4, 2015, President Obama signed this bill into
law; it became the FAST Act.120
FAST borrows many of the key features of the president’s initiative to expedite federal decisionmaking
through improved efficiency, increased transparency, and
application of best practices.121 For example, it establishes
the Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council, the
composition of which closely tracks the steering committee
created by Executive Order No. 13604. The council is run
by an executive director who is appointed by the president
(without needing U.S. Senate confirmation). Moreover, the
statute requires that federal agencies maintain an online
118. DOI, Secretarial Order No. 3285A1, Renewable Energy Development by
the Department of the Interior (Feb. 22, 2010).
119. David J. Hayes, Congress Just Enacted New Permitting Requirements for Energy
Projects: Did You Miss It?, Stan. L. Sch. Blog, Dec. 10, 2015, https://law.
stanford.edu/2015/12/10/congress-just-enacted-new-permitting-requirementsfor-energy-projects-did-you-miss-it/.
120. Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312.
121. This summary is drawn from Edward McTiernan et al., Expediting
Environmental Review and Permitting of Infrastructure Projects: The 2015
FAST Act and NEPA, Real Est. Fin. J. 50 (Winter/Spring 2016).
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permitting dashboard that presents project-specific permitting timetables, including projected dates for completion
of environmental reviews and issuance of permits.
The permitting provisions apply to a broad swath of
projects, not only those involving surface transportation.
FAST applies to activities “involving construction of infrastructure for renewable or conventional energy production, electricity transmission,” and many other kinds of
infrastructure.122 To qualify as a covered project, the initial anticipated total investment must be likely to exceed
$200,000,000, and the project must trigger NEPA and be
of a “size and complexity” such that “in the opinion of the
Council . . . the project [is] likely to benefit from enhanced
oversight and coordination . . . .”123
The council plays a key role in refining FAST’s scheme
for modernizing infrastructure permitting. The council is
required to survey the key federal development agencies,
develop an inventory of covered projects, and identify
appropriate project categories. Based upon these categories, by December 2016, the council “shall develop recommended performance schedules, including intermediate
and final completion dates, for environmental reviews
and authorizations most commonly required for each
category. . . .”124 These schedules “shall reflect employment of the use of the most efficient applicable processes,
including the alignment of Federal reviews of projects
and reduction of permitting and project delivery time.”125
These schedules are not to exceed the average completion
time for comparable projects. The statute creates a process for computing and then continuously updating these
average completion times.
The new law further requires that
[e]ach performance schedule shall specify that any decision by an agency on an environmental review or authorization must be issued not later than 180 days after the date
on which all information needed to complete the review or
authorization (including any hearing that an agency holds
on the matter) is in the possession of the applicant.126
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Other federal agencies are directed to cooperate with the
lead agency in the processing of the application. Any disputes among agencies are to be resolved through a process
established by the statute. The statute limits judicial review
of project approvals by setting a two-year statute of limitations; allowing only parties that submitted comments during the environmental review process to sue, and then only
about issues that had been raised in the comments; and in
ruling on preliminary injunction motions, the court must
consider the potential effects on public health, safety, the
environment, and jobs. The statute also provides for coordination with state approvals, and for use of environmental review information developed at the state level so as to
avoid unnecessary duplication.
On September 22, 2016, in one of its final public acts
before President Obama left office, the council published
an initial list of 34 covered projects.128 As of April 10, 2017,
31 projects were posted on the council’s permitting dashboard; seven of these were renewable energy projects (solar
and hydropower).129
On January 24, 2017, just-inaugurated President
Trump issued an Executive Order, Expediting Environmental Reviews and Approvals for High Priority
Infrastructure.130 It directs the CEQ to take the lead in
coordinating federal efforts to expedite projects that are
selected “after consideration of the project’s importance
to the general welfare, value to the Nation, environmental benefits, and such other factors as the Chairman
[of CEQ] deems relevant.” This language is certainly
broad enough to encompass renewable energy projects.
It is unclear why this Executive Order did not reference
the FAST Act. However, the Executive Order signifies
President Trump’s commitment to expediting project
approval. It is unclear whether renewable projects will
benefit from this commitment, or whether the FAST Act
will be utilized effectively. However, the FAST Act creates a statutory basis for expediting approvals.

Furthermore, “[e]ach Federal agency shall conform to
the completion dates set forth in the permitting timetable established . . .” by the council.127 FAST stops short of
allowing default approvals when agencies miss final deadlines. Nevertheless, it may give project sponsors a basis for
seeking judicial relief for delayed permit decisions. Each
covered project will have a lead agency, which will establish a plan for coordinating public and agency participation in any required federal environmental review, and set
a permitting timetable, which may only be modified under
limited circumstances. There are also constraints on how
long the review date may be extended.

Recommendations: Federal agencies should structure their
reviews of new wind and solar capacity so that they can be
completed as quickly as is reasonably possible. As noted at
the beginning of this Article, in order to meet the DDPP
targets, the amount of new wind and solar capacity that
will need to be added each year must be an order of magnitude higher than what has been achieved in prior years.
Even with an expedited NEPA process of the sort intended
by FAST, reviewing and approving all these new facilities
could swamp the ability of the regulatory agencies to handle such a volume. Two approaches are readily apparent.
The first is to increase staffing at the agencies. Given the
difficulty in increasing government budgets, it has become
increasingly common for agencies to allow or require appli-

122. Pub. L. No. 114-94, §41001(6)(A).
123. Id.
124. Id. §41002(c)(1)(C)(i).
125. Id. §41002(c)(1)(C)(ii)(I).
126. Id. §41002(c)(1)(C)(ii)(II)(cc).
127. Id. §41003(c)(2)(F)(i).

128. Permitting Dashboard, FPISC Announces FAST-41 Covered Projects, https://
www.permits.performance.gov/about/news/executive-director-announcesfast-41-covered-projects (last updated Mar. 11, 2017).
129. Permitting Dashboard, Projects, https://www.permits.performance.gov/
projects (last visited May 1, 2017).
130. Exec. Order No. 13766, 82 Fed. Reg. 8657 (Jan. 30, 2017).
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cants to help pay for the costs of review, often through the
use of higher permit application fees, enabling more staff or
contractors to be hired to perform these tasks. (For example, DOI already arranges for applicants to pay for certain
review work.) This of course leads to concerns over whether
the reviews are completely independent. These problems are
reduced if the funds go into general agency coffers rather
than being used to hire personnel to look at specific projects.131 These additional personnel resources could assist
with the full range of permitting issues—not only those
under NEPA. It will be important to ensure that the agencies
retain control of the review work to minimize the chances of
applicant capture. It is also important not to further reduce
the staffing levels of the federal review agencies.
The second approach is to require fewer project-specific
EIS by, for example, the more strategic use of programmatic EIS. As discussed above, BLM’s Western Solar Plan,
and BOEM’s designation of wind energy areas, both successfully utilized programmatic EIS to consider impacts of
similar projects over a broad geographic area.
Another way to reduce the number of EIS is to allow
more projects to obtain approvals with a lower degree of
environmental review. There are three levels of NEPA
review: categorical exclusions (meaning that projects are of
a type or size that have been previously determined not
to have a significant environmental impact, and therefore
not needing further environmental review); environmental
assessments, which are shorter than EIS, leading to a finding of no significant impact (FONSI); and full EIS. Of
all actions subject to NEPA, about 95% receive categorical
exclusions; about 5% receive FONSIs; and fewer than 1%
have EIS.132
A middle ground between a standard FONSI and a
full EIS is a “mitigated FONSI”—a finding that no EIS
is required if certain specified actions are taken to mitigate the project’s impacts. Courts have accepted mitigated
FONSIs as compliant with NEPA.133 CEQ or projectapproving agencies such as BLM or BOEM could amend
their NEPA regulations to provide that a mitigated FONSI
is the preferred method for reviewing certain kinds of
renewable projects if specified types of mitigation measures
are undertaken and if the particular site does not pose special problems.134
131. See Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting,
46 Akron L. Rev. 1091 (2013); Miriam Seifter, Rent-a-Regulator: Design
and Innovation in Privatized Governmental Decisionmaking, 33 Ecology
L.Q. 1091 (2006); Pat Ware, Hazardous Waste: Several States With Privatized
Programs Getting Speedier Cleanups at Lower Cost, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA),
Aug. 9, 2012, at B-1; Karen Young, Air Pollution: New Georgia Program Will
Allow Companies to Pay Fees to Accelerate Air Permit Process, Daily Env’t
Rep. (BNA), June 27, 2013, at A-4.
132. GAO, supra note 114, at 7. For an innovative legislative approach to
providing NEPA categorical exclusions to actions that meet certain
conditions, see Jamilee E. Holmstead, Looking a Gift Horse in the
Mouth: 2014 Farm Bill Insect and Disease Restoration Provisions—True
Gift or False Hope? (2015) (M.S. thesis, Utah State University), http://
digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5523&context=etd.
133. City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1033, 29 ELR 20096 (9th
Cir. 1998).
134. See Trevor Salter, NEPA and Renewable Energy: Realizing the Most
Environmental Benefit in the Quickest Time, 34 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y
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Along similar lines, several cities (most prominently
Chicago and San Francisco) offer projects that meet certain environmental standards expedited review, reduced
permit fees, and other benefits.135 Likewise, agencies could
grant review preference to renewable projects that met
specified conditions.
The federal government should vigorously implement the new FAST provisions to achieve the expedited
review of renewable energy projects. One element would
be the imposition of time limits on reviews under NEPA,
the ESA, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act for
renewable projects.136
Federal agencies with permitting or review roles should
be required—perhaps through an amendment to CEQ’s
NEPA regulations—to address their issues on the frontend of the process, before projects are set in stone and
before the scoping of an EIS. Too often, this now happens
much later in the process.137
The CEQ NEPA regulations should require agencies to
consider the positive as well as the negative environmental
impacts of proposed actions when making decisions after
environmental review; this is not always done now. The
positive impacts of renewable energy projects can include
reduced fossil fuel use.

V.

State and Local Approvals

Many central station renewable projects require federal
approvals, but all require state approvals and some also
need local approvals. Some states and localities have been
very hospitable to such projects; others have been less so.
This section discusses the obstacles that some states and
localities have posed to utility-scale projects, and how those
obstacles might be addressed.
With respect to wind, as noted above, the leader by
far is Texas. As of December 2016, it had 20,321 MW
of installed wind capacity, nearly triple the second state,
Iowa, with 6,917 MW, and the third, Oklahoma, which
had 6,645 MW. The rest of the top 10 were California,
with 5,662 MW; Kansas, 4,451 MW; Illinois, 4,026 MW;
Minnesota, 3,526 MW; Oregon, 3,163 MW; Washington,
3,075 MW; and Colorado, 3,026 MW.138
As for solar, California is on top by a wide margin. As
of December 2016, it had 18,296 MW of installed utilityscale solar capacity. Next were North Carolina, with 3,016
MW; Arizona, 2,982 MW; Nevada, 2,191 MW; New Jersey, 1,991 MW; Utah, 1,489 MW; Massachusetts, 1,487
J. 173 (2011).
135. U.S. Green Building Council, Green Building Incentive Strategies (2010),
http://www.slocounty.ca.gov/Assets/PL/Green+Building/Green+Building+
Incentive+Strategies.pdf; City of Chicago, Green Permits, http://www.
cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/bldgs/provdrs/green_permit.html (last visited May 1, 2017).
136. Thaler, supra note 83, at 1143-46.
137. David J. Hayes, Leaning on NEPA to Improve the Federal Permitting Process,
45 ELR 10018 (Jan. 2015), available at http://www.eli.org/sites/default/
files/docs/elrjan.pdf.
138. American Wind Energy Association, Wind Energy Facts at a Glance, http://
www.awea.org/wind-energy-facts-at-a-glance (last visited May 1, 2017).
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MW; Georgia, 1,432 MW; Texas, 1,215 MW; and New
York, 927 MW.139
If Texas were a country, it would have the sixth largest wind-generating capacity in the world.140 The boom in
wind energy in Texas was certainly not driven by concern
about climate change; oil and gas continues to be a dominant industry.141 Rather, it stems from a combination of
favorable economics, good planning, aggressive entrepreneurs, and the excellent wind resource enjoyed by much
of the state. The deregulation of the state’s power sector
in 1999 under then-Gov. George W. Bush and a Republican legislature weakened the utilities monopoly and
introduced competition. The same year, Texas adopted
a renewable portfolio standard requiring 2,000 MW of
new renewable energy capacity to be installed statewide
by 2009. In 2005, the Texas Legislature raised the goal to
5,880 MW by 2015 and included a target of 10,000 MW
by 2025. The state reached the 10,000 MW target in 2010,
15 years ahead of schedule.142
The federal production tax credit provided developers
with an excellent incentive to build wind. Landowners
were happy to receive income for the use of their land for
turbines and transmission lines, and counties and school
boards were pleased by the tax revenues. Everyone liked
the lower electricity rates and the added jobs. Essential
to all of this was an action by the legislature in 2005
creating competitive renewable energy zones (CREZs)—
a $6.9 billion undertaking, completed to 2014, to build
transmission lines that take the wind-generated power to
market. It covers approximately 3,600 miles of right-ofway and is designed to serve approximately 18,500 MW
of power.
CREZs are run by the Electric Reliability Council of
Texas, the state’s grid operator. The availability of these
lines led to competition to build many wind farms. Since
Texas is largely isolated electrically from the rest of the
country, its grid is not subject to regulation by FERC.
Without federal involvement (other than the subsidies), the
Texas grid is not subject to NEPA, and Texas has no little
NEPA law, so EIS are not needed. Offshore wind energy
and solar energy are also poised to expand rapidly in Texas,
139. Solar Energy Industries Association, Top 10 Solar States, http://www.seia.
org/research-resources/top-10-solar-states (last visited May 1, 2017).
140. It would be behind China, the United States, Germany, India, and
Spain, and ahead of the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, and
Brazil. Global Wind Energy Council, Global Wind Statistics
2015 (2016), available at http://www.gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/vip/
GWEC-PRstats-2015_LR.pdf.
141. This account is drawn from Warren Lasher, The Competitive Renewable
Energy Zones Process, ERCOT, Aug. 11, 2014; Roger Real Drouin, How
Conservative Texas Took the Lead in U.S. Wind Power, Yale Env’t 360, Apr.
9, 2015; The Texas Renewable Energy Industry, Texas Wide Open
for Business (2014); Bill Spindle & Rebecca Smith, Which State Is a
Big Renewable Energy Pioneer? Texas, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 2016; James
Osborne, As Wind Boom Continues CREZ Capacity in Question, Dallas
Morning News, Feb. 13, 2015; Mark Del Franco, Nearly Completed CREZ
Lines Unlock Wind Congestion, N. Am. Windpower (undated). See also
Kate Galbraith & Asher Price, The Great Texas Wind Rush: How
George Bush, Ann Richards, and a Bunch of Tinkerers Helped the
Oil and Gas State Win the Race to Wind Power (2013).
142. Spindle & Smith, supra note 141.
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and additional transmission may have to be built to handle
this abundance of renewable energy.
Moving to solar, if California were a country, it
would have the sixth largest generating capacity.143 It has
nearly one-half of the total installed capacity for solar
in the United States,144 and the amount of it has been
growing rapidly. California receives a great deal of sunlight (insolation), and like everywhere, the costs of PV
cells have been falling steeply. Unlike Texas, however,
California is the state that has most fervently supported
(and acted upon) the fight against climate change, and
the growth of solar has been driven more by policy than
by intrinsic economics. Californians tolerate relatively
high electric rates.
California’s renewable portfolio standard has been an
important driver of the growth of solar; established in
2002, it rose from 20% (to be achieved by 2010) in 2006
to 33% (by 2020) in 2009 to 50% (by 2030) in October
2015.145 The growth of rooftop solar has been spurred by
net metering laws and the Million Solar Roofs Initiative.146
More than 75,000 workers were employed in the solar
industry in the state by the end of 2015.147 As of September 2016, California had 7,350 MW in major solar projects
in operation and another 27,948 MW in construction or
under development.148
However, things have not gone as smoothly for central
station solar plants in California. Solar PV farms require
permits from local governments, typically county planning commissions, whereas solar thermal plants must be
approved by the California Energy Commission, which
has jurisdiction over power plants that generate 50 MW
or more of electricity and also use heat to produce electricity. All these projects must go through California’s
little NEPA law, the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA),149 and there is controversy over the extent to
which CEQA has inhibited the growth of solar in California.150 In 2008, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger signed
Executive Order No. S-14-08, designed to expedite the
143. International Energy Agency, Trends 2015 in Photovoltaic
Applications 30, tbl. 3 (2015).
144. In the first quarter of 2016, there was 27.5 GWdc in solar operating
capacity in the United States (PV only). GTM Research & Solar
Industries Association, U.S. Solar Market Insight 2016 Q2
Executive Summary 5.
145. California Energy Commission, Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS), http://
www.energy.ca.gov/portfolio/ (last visited May 1, 2017).
146. Lindsey Hallock & Michelle Kinman, California’s Solar Success Story:
How the Million Solar Roofs Initiative Transformed the State’s Solar Energy
Landscape, Env’t Cal., Apr. 2015.
147. Ivan Penn, California Solar Industry Job Growth Reaches Record Levels, L.A.
Times, Feb. 10, 2016.
148. Solar Energy Industries Association, Major Solar Projects in
the United States Operating, Under Construction, or Under
Development 2 (updated Sept. 14, 2016).
149. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§21000 et seq.
150. Sean Hecht, Anti-CEQA Lobbyists Turn to Empirical Analysis, but Are
Their Conclusions Sound?, Legal Plant, Sept. 28, 2015, http://legalplanet.org/2015/09/28/anti-ceqa-lobbyists-turn-to-empirical-analysis-butare-their-conclusions-sound/; David Huard, What Is Really Causing Renewable Project Failures in California?, Envtl. Leader, May 17, 2011,
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2011/05/17/what-is-really-causingrenewable-project-failures-in-california/.
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permitting of renewable energy facilities by, among other
things, creating a more coordinated permitting process
for projects that must go through the California Energy
Commission. However, one empirical study found that
these projects actually take twice as long to be approved
as those that get county approval.151
Some of these plants have faced considerable litigation.152 As discussed below, the Ivanpah solar plant faced
major difficulties due to the ESA. The county approvals
have become obstacles in some cases; in August 2016, the
San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors voted not to
approve the 287-MW Soda Mountain Solar Project, which
had been approved by BLM, but had drawn widespread
opposition because of its proximity to the Mojave National
Preserve and its potential impact on species habitat.153
Moreover, according to one study, Texas is moving ahead
of California in building renewable energy because Texas
has been more stringent in enforcing its renewable portfolio standard, gives a single administrator the power to run
the renewables program (as opposed to California’s more
decentralized system), and has done a much better job in
building needed transmission.154
Some states other than Texas and California have begun
moving aggressively to increase their renewables capacity.
As noted above, Iowa is second only to Texas in its installed
wind capacity. This amount may soon increase considerably; in August 2016, the Iowa Utilities Board approved a
plan by MidAmerican Energy to erect 1,000 new turbines
with a total capacity of 2,000 MW on several sites around
the state at an estimated cost of $3.6 billion.155 In June 2015,
Hawaii enacted a law requiring all electric power to come
from renewables by 2045.156 In August 2016, the New York
Public Service Commission approved the Clean Energy
Standard supported by Governor Cuomo that requires
50% renewable energy use by the power sector by 2030.
Most states that have wanted to greatly expand their
onshore renewable energy capacity have been able to do
so without great legal difficulty, and many states have
established processes for approval of renewable facilities.157
It is seldom necessary to invoke eminent domain for new
renewable energy generating facilities, as enough landown151. Meaghan Mroz-Barrett, Utility Scale Solar Projects in California: An Initial
Survey 14 (2015) (M.C.R.P. thesis, California Polytechnic State University),
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2535&cont
ext=theses.
152. Laura Mulry, Green vs. Green: Litigation for and Against Solar Power in
California, Climate L. Blog, Sabin Center for Climate Change L.,
May 18, 2011, http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2011/05/18/
green-vs-green-litigation-for-and-against-solar-power-in-california/.
153. Louis Sahagun, San Bernardino County Rejects a Controversial Solar Plant
Proposed for the Mojave Desert, L.A. Times, Aug. 24, 2016; Scott Streater,
Calif. County Rejects Massive BLM-Approved Project, Greenwire, Aug. 24,
2016.
154. Maria C. Faconti, How Texas Overcame California as a Renewable State: A
Look at the Texan Renewable Energy Success, 14 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 411 (2013).
155. Iowa Utilities Board Approves Huge Wind Energy Project, Des Moines Reg.,
Aug. 29, 2016.
156. H.B. No. 623 (2015).
157. Jesse Heibel & Jocelyn Durkay, State Legislative Approaches to Wind Energy
Facility Siting, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures, Nov. 1, 2016, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/energy/state-wind-energy-siting.aspx.
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ers have been willing to lease or sell their land for this purpose, though their neighbors are not always happy.
It is important to distinguish between state attitudes
and local attitudes toward renewables siting. Most states
have favored new renewables, but there are exceptions.
Despite its abundant wind resource, Nebraska has not
been especially hospitable to wind, partly due to resistance
from its strong public power industry.158 Connecticut had a
moratorium on new wind projects from 2011 to 2014 while
it developed regulations.159 Ohio adopted setback rules in
2014 that have greatly impeded new wind development.160
However, these states are the exceptions.
On the other hand, many municipalities have opposed
wind farms, mostly due to objections from the neighbors,
and some have used their land use power to stop projects.
In 48 of the 50 states, local governments have significant
control over the siting of commercial-scale wind facilities,
and in 34 states, local governments have substantial autonomy to regulate such facilities.161 The ability of states to
limit local control varies, depending largely on the degree
of “home rule” that each state’s laws give its municipalities.
Several states have created siting councils to provide
one-stop (or at least few-stop) procedures for major new
energy facilities, including renewables; this can reduce
the hurdles that project developers need to surmount, and
at a minimum could help ensure that reviews are conducted simultaneously rather than sequentially. Some
of these councils have the power under various circumstances to preempt local governments’ ability to block
such facilities.162 (Other states’ siting councils, such as the
California Energy Commission, can only approve thermal
electric plants.) Some states do not have siting councils,
but nonetheless have statutes that preempt local control
over certain renewables.163
The absence of local laws specifically aimed at the siting of renewable facilities has also inhibited construction in many places, and in some locations, there are laws
specifically barring or inhibiting these facilities. Several
organizations have prepared model wind or solar facility
158. Allan M. Williams, The Winds of Change: How Nebraska Law Has Stalled
the Development of Wind Energy and What Can Be Done to Spur Growth, 47
Creighton L. Rev. 477 (2013/2014).
159. Douglas E. Lamb & Clare M. Lewis, Connecticut’s Moratorium on Wind
Projects to End?, McGuireWoods LLP, May 1, 2014.
160. Dan Gearino, Amazon Official Criticizes Ohio’s Wind Standards in Testimony,
Columbus Dispatch, May 19, 2016.
161. Environmental Law Institute, State Enabling Legislation for
Commercial-Scale Wind Power Siting and the Local Government
Role i (2011), available at https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/
d21-02.pdf.
162. Among these are the Washington State Facility Site Evaluation Council;
the Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council; the New York State Board on
Electric Generation Siting and the Environment; Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission; the Connecticut Siting Council; the New Hampshire Site
Evaluation Committee; the Vermont Public Service Board; and the Rhode
Island Facilities Siting Board. See K.K. DuVivier & Thomas Witt, NIMBY
to Nope—Or YESS?, 38 Cardozo L. Rev. 1453 (2017); Uma Outka,
Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927
(2015); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 477 (2011).
163. Wis. Stat. Ann. §66.0401; Minnesota Public Utilities Commission,
Wind Turbine Siting Review Procedures (2008).
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ordinances.164 DOE has posted a catalog of 406 local wind
energy ordinances.165
Some commentators have suggested enactment of a federal statute that would allow for preemption of local vetoes
of renewable energy projects.166 It is not clear if such preemption is needed. As just noted, several states have preemptive power. Municipal disapproval of wind projects was
becoming a problem in New York,167 so in 2011, the state
amended the Public Service Law to allow the state siting
board to preempt such disapprovals for projects of 25 MW
or greater,168 though smaller projects still face local law
obstacles.169 Iowa and Texas lack both preemptive power
and state siting councils, but they nonetheless have led the
nation in siting new wind facilities. Some proposed facilities have been blocked by local governments, but it is hard
to tell if this has emerged as a major obstacle to increasing
national wind and solar generating capacity by central station units. In other contexts, federal attempts to preempt
state or local control over facility siting have backfired and
have escalated opposition without actually leading to the
construction of new facilities.170
Recommendations: Many states do not have adequate laws
and procedures in place to review and approve large-scale
renewable projects. Those states should emulate the states
that do have such laws and procedures in place, such as
California, New York, Oregon, and Washington.171 The
examples of Iowa and Texas show that special siting councils may not be essential in expanding construction of
renewables, but their presence could certainly help smooth
the way.
A major factor in securing local acceptance is whether
municipalities and their residents see any benefit from the
project. In some parts of the country, rental of land for wind
turbines provides significant income. Business Week headlined one story “Wind Is the New Corn: In Some of the
Poorest Rural Areas in the U.S., Turbines Are a Fresh Source
164. E.g., National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners,
Wind Energy & Park Siting and Zoning Best Practices and Guidance
for States (2012), available at http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/539BA6EE2354-D714-5157-359DDD67CE7F; Sabin Center for Climate Change
Law, http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/model-laws-and-protocols/
model-municipal-ordinances/. See James M. McElfish Jr. & Sara Gersen,
Local Standards for Wind Power Siting: A Look at Model Ordinances, 41 ELR
10825 (Sept. 2011).
165. DOE, WINDExchange, http://apps2.eere.energy.gov/wind/windexchange/
policy/ordinances.asp (last updated Nov. 24, 2015).
166. E.g., Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 90 Emory
L.J. 877 (2011); Melanie McCammon, Environmental Perspectives on Siting
Wind Farms: Is Greater Federal Control Warranted?, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J.
1243 (2009). See also Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45
Conn. L. Rev. 417 (2012).
167. See Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)
(upholding municipal moratorium on wind farms).
168. Michael B. Gerrard, New York’s Revived Power Plant Siting Law Preempts
Local Control, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 8, 2011.
169. Steve Orr, D&C Investigation: Big Solar Coming to NYS, Some Are
Wary, Democrat & Chron., Nov. 22, 2016, http://www.democrat
andchronicle.com/story/news/2016/11/22/solar-power-energy-new-yorkupsate/92844228/.
170. Michael B. Gerrard, Whose Backyard, Whose Risk: Fear and
Fairness in Toxic and Nuclear Waste Siting (MIT Press 1994).
171. Thaler, supra note 83, at 1146-47.
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of Wealth.”172 Many towns look for “benefit sharing,” particularly payments (whether framed as taxes or otherwise). This
method has proven successful in the siting of many kinds
of facilities, such as solid waste landfills, resource recovery
facilities, and transfer stations. Where the renewable energy
facilities are to be located in minority communities, payments from the developers into those communities could
help reduce environmental justice concerns.
Should local blockage become a major problem, a model
for overcoming it is provided by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.173 In the face of major difficulties in siting
towers for the rapidly growing cellular telephone industry, Congress adopted a statute that left substantive siting
decisions primarily with local governments, but imposed
constraints on the approval process they could use. In
particular, it prevented local governments from banning
towers entirely, while still allowing localities to determine
where the towers would go. It imposed time limits on their
deliberations; if those limits were exceeded, it created a
federal cause of action allowing the applicants to sue the
municipalities in federal district court to obtain a speedy
decision. The municipalities were also required to set forth
detailed written explanations of any permit denials.174 The
one substantive restriction is that localities may not regulate towers “on the basis of the environmental effects of
radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with [Federal Communications Commission]
regulations.”175 The statute has proven very successful and
has supported a tremendous expansion of cellular telephone service.176
Another potential model is the portion of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 pertaining to the siting of liquefied
natural gas terminals.177 It preempts certain state powers,
gives special powers to FERC to coordinate federal reviews,
and expedites judicial review. However, the process has not
always gone smoothly, as states often resent preemption of
their powers and may find alternative methods of impeding projects.178
Following the lead of the Telecommunications Act and
the Energy Policy Act, a federal renewables statute could
prohibit local governments from banning renewable energy
facilities, require local governments to make decisions in
facility siting within a reasonable period of time, require
that the decisions be made in writing and supported by
substantial evidence, and create a federal right-of-action
for applicants to enforce these procedures.179 Most states
172. Jennifer Oldham, Wind Is the New Corn, Bus. Wk., Oct. 16, 2016, at 16.
173. 42 U.S.C. §332(c)(7).
174. T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808 (2015).
175. 42 U.S.C. §332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
176. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48
Harv. J. on Legis. 289 (2011).
177. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, tit. III,
amending Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717-17w.
178. See Jacob Dweck et al., Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the
Energy Policy Act of 2005: State Powers in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 Energy
L.J. 473 (2006); Kenneth T. Kristl, Renewable Energy and Preemption:
Lessons From Siting LNG Terminals, 23 Nat. Resources & Env’t 58 (2009).
179. This concept is discussed in detail in Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman
Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving
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would also have the power to preempt local government
bans. Whether the federal government or the states would
be more inclined to adopt such provisions, of course, will
largely depend on the federal and state politics at the particular time.

VI. Species Protection Laws
The federal ESA,180 the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA) of 1918,181 and other statutes designed to protect
species, especially birds, have become an impediment to
some utility-scale renewable energy projects, both wind
and solar. These laws serve extremely important functions in protecting biodiversity and other values, but ways
must be found to reconcile them with the environmental
imperative of building a large number of new renewable
energy facilities.
None of these species protection laws has a “green
pass”—an exemption for projects that confer other environmental benefits.182 Wind turbines can kill birds and
bats; solar arrays can cover over the habitat of desert creatures; other adverse impacts can occur. This has led to
tension within the environmental movement between the
efforts to fight climate change and to protect biodiversity, especially given the scale of renewable energy construction that will be needed. By the time the ESA was
enacted in 1973, the United States had already built the
core of its massive national-scale infrastructure systems,
including the interstate highway system, the Intracoastal
Waterway, the oil and gas pipeline system, the electric
power grid, and the major airports. When that infrastructure was built, rare creatures could be swept away.183
That is no longer so.
These tensions have inevitably led to a large volume of
litigation. Most of the suits challenging renewable projects
because of their species impacts have failed,184 but these
claims do provide project opponents with legal and political ammunition. There appears to have been only one decision halting a project because of a violation of the ESA.
That concerned a wind farm in West Virginia that had
failed to obtain an incidental take permit (a requirement
discussed below) for its impact on the endangered Indiana
bat.185 That project later obtained the needed permit and
went forward, though with some restrictions.186 Several
other projects were found to violate NEPA because of inadSustainability, 37 Hofstra L. Rev. 1049 (2009).
180. 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.
181. Id. §§703 et seq.
182. J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the Endangered Species
Act Through Administrative Reform, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1769, 1773 (2012).
183. Id. at 1774.
184. John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 Notre Dame
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 59 (2013); Lisa Wing Stone & Sara Zdeb,
Lessons Learned From Wind Farm Litigation, Envtl. Litig. & Toxic Torts
Committee Newsl. (American Bar Association), Mar. 2009, at 2. See also
Renewable Energy Project Challenges—Snapshot of the Litigation Landscape,
The Lawyer, Nov. 15, 2012.
185. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy L.L.C., 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 39
ELR 20278 (D. Md. 2009).
186. Gordon Smith, Birds and Bats and Blades, Envtl. F., May/June 2015, at 36.
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equate analysis of species impacts; all of these were allowed
to go back and prepare supplemental analysis.187 Similarly,
the National Historic Preservation Act188 has sometimes
proven to be a temporary obstacle, especially when Indian
tribes are involved.189
Several projects in North America have been cancelled
at least in part due to species issues, including the Palen
solar project in California,190 a 177-MW wind project on a
rural area of Saskatchewan, Canada,191 and a wind project
at an Ohio National Guard base along Lake Erie (though
this one may come back).192 Others have been significantly
reduced in size.193 As discussed elsewhere in this Article,
species impacts were major issues for the Cape Wind
project and the Ivanpah solar project. The American Bird
Conservancy is opposing any and all wind projects in the
Great Lakes.194
Climate change itself will, of course, cause many species to go extinct; the warmer it gets, the more species
will disappear.195 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports with “high confidence” that a “large
fraction of species faces increased extinction risk due to
climate change during and beyond the 21st century, especially as climate change interacts with other stressors.”196
One study found that more than one-third of North
American birds face extinction risk, and climate change
and sea-level rise are among the main reasons.197 Another
study classified more than one-half (314 of 588) of North
187. Union Neighbors United Inc. v. Jewell, No. 15-5147, 46 ELR 20133 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 5, 2016); Public Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper,
No. 14-5301 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 2016); Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v.
Jewell, 823 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2016); Bundorf v. Jewell, 142 F. Supp. 3d
1138, 45 ELR 20205 (D. Nev. 2015).
188. 54 U.S.C. §§300101 et seq.
189. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (granting preliminary
injunction against solar project due to failure to consult with Indian tribe,
in violation of National Historic Preservation Act).
190. End of the Line for the Palen Solar Project, KCET, Feb. 11, 2016; Sammy
Roth, Palen Solar Project Near Joshua Tree on Life Support, Desert Sun, Dec.
10, 2015.
191. Press Release, Government of Saskatchewan, Wind Energy Project Denied
to Protect Migratory Birds (Sept. 19, 2016).
192. John Seewer, Birders Win Halt to National Guard Wind Turbine, Columbus
Dispatch, Feb. 9, 2014.
193. BLM, Silver State South Project and Las Vegas Field Office Resource Management Plan Amendment, Record of Decision (2014);
BLM, Notice of Availability of the Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement and the Proposed Resource Management Plan
Amendment for the Silver State Solar South Project, Clark County, NV, 79
Fed. Reg. 9921 (Feb. 21, 2014), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2014-02-21/pdf/2014-03685.pdf. (solar project reduced from 350
MW to 250 MW, largely due to concerns about desert tortoise); Julie Cart,
BrightSource Energy Has Spent $56 Million So Far to Protect the Threatened
Creatures, but Calamities Have Befallen the Effort, L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 2012
(Ivanpah solar project).
194. Press Release, American Bird Conservancy, Wind Turbines on the Great
Lakes Threaten Migratory Birds (Aug. 5, 2016). See also Hannah Treppa,
Not a Huge Fan: Deterring the Implementation of Wind Turbines in the Great
Lakes, 93 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 321 (2016).
195. Mark C. Urban, Accelerating Extinction Risk From Climate Change, 348
Science 571 (2015).
196. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change
2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers 13.
197. North American Bird Conservation Initiative, The State of North
America’s Birds 2016, available at http://www.stateofthebirds.org/2016/
wp-content/uploads/2016/05/SoNAB-ENGLISH-web.pdf.
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American bird species as climate-endangered or -threatened in this century.198
The impacts of wind turbines are negligible compared
to other sources of bird mortality. Far more birds are killed
by collisions with buildings and communication towers,
attacks from cats, and poisoning from pesticides.199 One
study attempted to look at the life cycles of various power
sources (including coal and uranium mining, fossil fuel
combustion, etc.) and found that wind farms are responsible for roughly 0.27 avian fatalities per gigawatt-hour
(GWh) of electricity, while nuclear power plants involve
0.6 fatalities per GWh and fossil fuel-fired power stations
are responsible for about 9.4 fatalities per GWh.200
Several portions of the ESA have direct bearing on
the construction of renewable energy projects. Section 4
requires species to be listed as endangered or threatened
based on “the best scientific and commercial data available”
about the threats posed to their existence, without regard
to the consequences of listing.201 Section 7 requires that all
federal agencies “shall . . . insure that any action authorized, funded or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species.”202 Section 9 provides that
no one—including private parties—may “take” (defined
to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect”)203 any such species without a permit.204 Under §10, a permit to modify habitat in a way that
may “take” protected species may be issued only if the taking is “incidental” (i.e., not the purpose of the activity) and
the applicant submits a habitat conservation plan.205
All central station wind and solar projects fall under
§9, and unless they involve no onshore or offshore federal
land or approvals, they will also invoke §7. Some may also
involve state laws such as the California Endangered Species Act.
Section 7 is set up to deal with one species at a time, and
§9 one project at a time. Preparing a habitat conservation
plan under §10, with all the required consultations and
studies, can take several years and require considerable staff
time at FWS (the chief agency implementing the ESA) and
elsewhere. That becomes a real obstacle for a plan to build
a large number of big renewable energy projects in a fairly
short period of time.
Prof. J.B. Ruhl, a leading authority on the ESA, wrote
in 2012, “[A]fter almost ten years of policy development,
permitting, and litigation, there is still no comprehensive, tested, reliable template for commercial wind power

198. National Audubon Society, Audubon’s Birds and Climate Change
Report 6 (2015), available at http://climate.audubon.org/sites/default/
files/NAS_EXTBIRD_V1.3_9.2.15%20lb.pdf.
199. Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Avian and Wildlife Costs of Fossil Fuels and
Nuclear Power, 9 J. Integrative Envtl. Sci. 255, 263 (2012).
200. Id.
201. 16 U.S.C. §1533(b)(1).
202. Id. §1536(a)(2).
203. Id. §1532(19).
204. Id. §1538(a)(1)(B).
205. Id. §1539(a)(2).
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to secure expeditious ESA compliance.”206 FWS’ first significant step to help wind developers understand what is
expected of them came in 2003, with issuance of the Interim
Guidelines to Avoid and Minimize Wildlife Impacts on
Wind Turbines. In 2012, these were superseded by a much
more detailed set of land-based wind energy guidelines,
which were developed in close consultation with the wind
industry.207 Some progress has been made in accelerating
the process.
In order to cope with the cumbersome process of preparing habitat conservation plans, and the need to consider
the cumulative impacts of multiple projects in the same
area, FWS has been employing regional habitat conservation plans, which allow the environmental assessment
and wildlife permitting process to occur once for multiple
species over a large geographic area, merging the NEPA
and ESA processes. FWS began with three of these.208 The
Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan (for southern
California) has already been discussed. The Upper Great
Plains Wind Energy Plan, covering Iowa, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota,
was finalized in July 2016. It overlaps with the Midwest
Wind Energy Multi-Species Habitat Conservation Plan,
which concerns Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The draft of that
plan was released on April 15, 2016, and the comment
period closed on July 14, 2016.
These measures should greatly ease the process of building major wind projects. Each project can rely on the
regional habitat conservation plan and programmatic EIS,
and focus just on site-specific issues. Another measure that
has been found to speed the process is the use of programmatic biological opinions, in which FWS examines multiple similar actions or different actions proposed to occur
within the same area.209
Private governance is also playing a role. In 2008, the
American Wind Wildlife Institute, a partnership among
the wind industry, scientific community, and conservation
organizations, was formed to foster research and develop
tools to promote timely and responsible wind energy development that minimizes impacts to wildlife and wildlife
habitat. To address specific concerns about bats, the Bat
Wind Energy Cooperative, a collaboration of the wind
industry, Bat Conservation International, and DOE, was
formed in 2003 and has developed various mitigation
strategies.210 The Nature Conservancy has created the Biodiversity and Wind Siting Mapping Tool for New York
State to help wind developers avoid areas with particular
ecological vulnerability.
206. Ruhl, supra note 182, at 1788.
207. Id. at 1778-79.
208. Id. at 1783.
209. Melinda Taylor et al., Protecting Species or Hindering Energy Development?
How the Endangered Species Act Impacts Energy Projects on Western Public
Lands, 46 ELR 10924 (Nov. 2016).
210. Taber D. Allison et al., Thinking Globally and Siting Locally—Renewable
Energy and Biodiversity in a Rapidly Warming World, 126 Climatic Change
1, 4 (2014).
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Some scholars are resisting the idea of speeding up the
approval process for large wind projects. They argue that
the ecological risks and uncertainties are still too great, that
the processes should go more slowly while better information is developed, and that more focus should be devoted to
installing PV on rooftops, disturbed lands, and other less
environmentally sensitive sites.211 However, it is difficult to
reconcile these recommendations with the extraordinary
pace of construction required under the DDPP scenarios.
It is unquestionable that many uncertainties do exist.
This is illustrated by the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating
System, the largest concentrating solar plant in the world.
It is located on 3,500 acres of BLM land in San Bernardino
County, California, near the Nevada border.212 The private
developer, BrightSource Energy, Inc., first filed its application in 2007. It obtained a series of state and federal approvals, broke ground in 2010, and began generating power
in 2014. It consists of three 459-foot thermal collection
towers, each surrounded by a field of mirrors—more than
173,500 in all—that direct sunlight to the towers. Boilers in the towers produce steam that drives conventional
turbines that generate electricity, with a total capacity of
377 MW. Much of the attention during the environmental
review went to an endangered species, the desert tortoise.
Initial studies assumed that up to 38 tortoises lived on the
project site and would need to be relocated during construction. However, once construction began, it became
clear that far more tortoises lived there. Construction
stopped while FWS prepared a new biological opinion and
issued a new incidental take permit. Numerous measures
to minimize and monitor impacts were adopted. The project also needed to acquire and permanently preserve more
than 7,000 acres of off-site habitat for desert tortoises and
other species.
After the plant opened, an unanticipated phenomenon
occurred. In the words of Morgan Walton:
[L]ocal observers noticed “smoke plume[s]” in the air when
birds flew through the concentrated sun rays reflected off
of the mirrors. The workers called these birds “streamers”
for the image they created as the animals spontaneously
ignited in midair and hurtled to the ground in a smoking,
smoldering ball. These deaths are not isolated incidents
where only a few stray birds—reports estimate that over
3,500 birds have experienced a similar fate during the
plant’s first year, although the exact number is a subject
of debate.213

211. Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the Renewable
Energy Gold Rush, 15 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 293 (2014); Kalyani
Robbins, Responsible, Renewable, and Redesigned: How the Renewable Energy
Movement Can Make Peace With the Endangered Species Act, 15 Minn. J.L.
Sci. & Tech. 555 (2014).
212. This account is drawn from Morris & Owley, supra note 211; Morgan
Walton, A Lesson From Icarus: How the Mandate for Rapid Solar Development
Has Singed a Few Feathers, 40 Vt. L. Rev. 131 (2015); and BrightSource,
Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System (2014), available at http://
www.brightsourceenergy.com/stuff/contentmgr/files/0/3eac1a9fed7f13fe40
06aaab8c088277/attachment/ivanpah_white_paper_0414.pdf.
213. Walton, supra note 212, at 132 (citations omitted).
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As this is written in June 2017, a technical solution
has not been announced, and the regulatory implications
remain unclear.214 Also unclear is the future of concentrating solar power—partly because of the Ivanpah experience,
and more importantly because of the plummeting cost of
PV cells, and their lower water consumption.
When species impacts are anticipated (even if very
imperfectly, as with Ivanpah), the first preference is to
avoid or at least reduce them, and to the extent that
some remain, mitigate them, which often involves finding substitute habitat. This is a tricky process, in part
because of the scientific uncertainty about how various
species will be affected, and whether and how long they
would thrive in other locations, especially in a changing
climate. DOI is trying to inject these issues into early
project planning and to strengthen the scientific basis for
decisionmaking.215
In addition to the ESA, two other federal statutes
contribute to challenges in siting utility-scale renewable
energy facilities. The first is the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act (MBTA),216 which makes it a criminal offense to kill a
migratory bird “by any means, or in any manner.” In 2001,
President Bill Clinton signed an Executive Order clarifying that this applies to unintentional as well as intentional
killing.217 The MBTA currently covers more than 1,000
bird species. In two instances, wind facility operators were
charged with violating this law. In 2013, Duke Energy
Renewables, Inc. was prosecuted for the deaths of 14 golden
eagles and 149 other protected birds at two wind projects in
Wyoming. In 2014, PacifiCorp Energy was charged in the
deaths of 38 golden eagles and 336 migratory birds at other
facilities in Wyoming. Both companies pled guilty, paid
substantial fines, and agreed to costly compliance plans. It
appears that neither company followed FWS guidance that
was in effect at the time.218
These prosecutions have led to some anxiety in the wind
industry. However, there is a solution. The MBTA gives the
Secretary of the Interior the authority to issue incidental
take permits, but unlike for the ESA or the eagle law (discussed below), the secretary has not established procedures
to issue such permits under the MBTA. Thus, wind farm
operators cannot be sure that they are operating legally if
birds die in their turbines, and they can be somewhat but
not absolutely certain that they will not be prosecuted if
they follow the guidelines. As several commentators have
already urged, the secretary should use this authority and
promulgate regulations for the issuance of incidental take
214. Louis Sahagun, This Mojave Desert Solar Plant Kills 6,000 Birds a Year. Here’s
Why That Won’t Change Any Time Soon, L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 2016.
215. Hayes, supra note 54; FWS, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants: Endangered Species Act Compensatory Mitigation Policy, 81 Fed.
Reg. 95316 (Dec. 27, 2016); Morris & Owley, supra note 211.
216. 16 U.S.C. §§703-712.
217. Exec. Order No. 13186, 66 Fed. Reg. 3853 (Jan. 17, 2001), Responsibilities
of Federal Agencies to Protect Migratory Birds.
218. Cassie Tigue, Wind Energy Development and Protection of Wildlife: Creating
a Balance Between Two Competing Interests, 45 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 223 (2015);
Smith, supra note 186, at 36; Alan Kovski, Cooperative Efforts Encouraged
to Reduce Risk of Wind Farm Bird Deaths, Legal Action, Daily Env’t Rep.
(BNA), Dec. 3, 2013, at A-9.
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permits under the MBTA, coupled with whatever requirements are necessary to minimize bird deaths.219
The other relevant statute is the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act of 1940.220 It bars the taking of either of
these kinds of birds, but it allows FWS to issue permits for
such taking. In 2009, FWS issued regulations authorizing
issuance of permits for the taking of eagles. These permits
would have a maximum term of five years. In 2013, partly
to encourage new wind farms, FWS amended its regulations to extend the maximum term of permits to 30 years.
Conservation groups were unhappy with this extension,
and they sued. In 2015, a court invalidated the rule because
FWS had not complied with NEPA in promulgating it;
FWS should have prepared an environmental assessment
or an EIS.221 FWS then went back, prepared a programmatic EIS, and in December 2016, it published a final rule
that extended the permit term to 30 years and also added
more stringent conservation standards and more flexible
mitigation requirements for permits.222
Recommendations: Professor Ruhl has made the following
sensible recommendations for improving the ESA process
for the review of renewable projects223:
1.	 FWS should enhance species impact databases
and standardized metrics for take assessment.
This would ease the process of evaluating projects’
impacts on species.
2.	 After appropriate review, FWS should consider
endorsing the work product of outside entities, such
as the landscape assessment tool produced by the
American Wind and Wildlife Institute. This would
provide greater clarity and specificity to all parties—government agencies, applicants, and environmental groups—in assessing project impacts
and identifying optimal siting.
3.	 FWS could develop standard methodologies for
mitigation of harms from particular kinds of utilityscale projects, drawing from a wide set of mitigation
options and recipes including habitat conservation
banks and payment formulae.224
219. Robert J. Martin & Rob Ballard, Reconciling the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
With Expanding Wind Energy to Keep Big Wheels Turning and Endangered
Birds Flying, 20 Animal L. 145 (2013); Krisztina Nadasdy, Killing Two Birds
With One Stone: How an Incidental Take Permit Program Under the MBTA
Can Help Companies and Migratory Birds, 41 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 167
(2014).
220. 16 U.S.C. §§668-668d.
221. Shearwater v. Ashe, No. 14-CV-02830-LHK, 45 ELR 20151 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 11, 2015).
222. FWS, Eagle Permits; Revisions to Regulations for Eagle Incidental Take and
Take of Eagle Nests, 81 Fed. Reg. 91494 (Dec. 16, 2016); S. Keith Garner,
FWS Proposes, Again, to Issue 30-Year Eagle Act Permits, Law360, June 21,
2016; Ankur K. Tohan et al., Eagle Take Permit Program Revamped—Longer
Permits and Clearer Mitigation Requirements, K&L Gates, May 23, 2016.
223. Ruhl, supra note 182, at 1796-98.
224. See Elinor Benami et al., Stanford Law School, Comments and
Recommendations for the Steering Committee on Federal
Infrastructure Permitting and Review Process Improvement and
the President’s Chief Performance Officer, Director of OIRA, and
Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality (2013), available
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4.	 FWS should consider the positive environmental
impact of renewable energy in granting mitigation
credit under the §10 process,225 and all federal agencies should consider these positive impacts in making decisions under NEPA.
These are additional specific actions that should be
taken:
1.	 FWS should use its existing authority to issue
incidental take permits under the MBTA so that
renewable project operators do not face criminal
prosecution if they take required precautions but
nonetheless some birds die.
2.	 The president should issue an Executive Order, or
the Secretary of the Interior should issue a departmental order, imposing time limitations (subject to
limited extensions for good cause) for the ESA §10
incidental take permit process and consider other
ways to make the process more efficient.
3.	 FWS should expand types of compensatory mitigation allowed for renewable energy project impacts
on wildlife. Some examples of compensation for
offshore wind projects, for example, could include
protecting or expanding existing breeding habitat,
such as seabird nesting islands; reducing mortality
of adults of long-lived species, such as in marine
mammal boat collisions or fisheries bycatch (birds,
sea turtle, nontarget vulnerable fish species); and
controlling pollutants, such as mercury, that reduce
reproductive success.226
4.	 FWS and the U.S. Department of Justice should
negotiate agreements with project applicants making clear that no enforcement actions will be taken
against any renewable projects that fulfill specified
protective measures.227
5.	 FWS, the scientific community, and the wind
industry should continue to develop techniques to
reduce bird and bat mortality from wind turbines.
The most prominent techniques so far involve
at https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/WHComments-Final1-Permitting.pdf.
225. Several provisions in ESA §10 could provide support for this measure. These
include the requirement that “the impact which will likely result from such
taking” (§10(a)(2)(A)(i)) be considered, which does not limit consideration
to local and immediate as opposed to global and cumulative impacts; that
“alternative actions to such taking” (§10(a)(2)(A)(iii)) be considered, which
should allow a broad review of the methods of reducing emissions from the
energy sector; and the necessary finding that “the taking will not appreciably
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild”
(§10(a)(2)(B)(iv)), which could also allow consideration of large-scale
impacts of renewable energy.
226. M. Wing Goodale & Anita Milman, Cumulative Adverse Effects of Offshore
Wind Energy Development on Wildlife, 59 J. Envtl. Plan. & Mgmt. 1, 12
(2016).
227. FWS did this in 2014 with EDF Renewable Energy. Andrew Bell, A
New Approach by USFWS Over Wind Energy Avian Issues, Marten L.,
Jan. 21, 2016. See also The Edison Electric Institute’s Avian Power
Line Interaction Committee & FWS, Avian Protection Plan (APP)
Guidelines (2005), available at http://www.aplic.org/uploads/files/2634/
APPguidelines_final-draft_Aprl2005.pdf.
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reducing turbine speed; turning them on only when
wind speed is above a certain level; and turning
them off during migration periods. Research should
also continue on new technologies such as verticalaxis turbines (which spin around a central axis like a
top), and ultrasonic acoustic systems and ultraviolet
lights that deter bats. Use of some of these techniques and technologies will presumably come to be
required by the permits for wind facilities.
In view of the serious obstacles that the ESA has posed
to renewable projects, should the day come when we have
a Congress that wants to preserve the ESA’s essential values
but wishes to promote aggressive construction of renewable facilities, it should consider creating an easier path
under §§7 and 10 for renewable projects that have met certain tightly defined conditions, such as thorough habitat
studies, adoption of all reasonable mitigation measures,
and utilization of any available technologies and techniques to minimize impacts. This might include special
provisions reducing the impediments to renewables caused
by certain species, such as the Indiana bat. As Taber D.
Allison and colleagues have written: “We argue the need
to accept some and perhaps substantial risk of impacts to
wildlife from renewable energy development in order to
limit the far greater risks to biodiversity loss owing to climate change.”228

VII. Needed Complementary Actions
This Article has discussed the legal obstacles to the construction of large numbers of central station wind and solar
generating facilities, focusing on the facilities themselves.
However, many other actions must take place in order for
this to happen.

A.

Grid Connection and Integration

As already noted several times, central station generators
must be connected to the load they serve. This may involve
running new power lines shorter or longer distances to
the nearest suitable grid connection, and it may require
upgrading the existing lines to handle the electricity supplied by the new renewable energy source.
It is not just a matter of plugging wires into the existing grid. The grid is a complex, finely tuned instrument,
and its proprietors (in many parts of the country, these
are regional transmission operators or independent system
operators) require a close examination to make sure the
new inflow of electrons will not disrupt the system. The
grid operators often have long queues of potential generating units seeking access, and it can take many months and
extensive studies to gain interconnection approval.
This is greatly complicated by the fact that the wind
does not always blow and the sun does not always shine.
This intermittency is one of the major impediments to
228. Allison et al., supra note 210, at 1.
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broader use of wind and solar power. Several techniques
are being developed to solve this problem. All manner of
storage technologies are being developed and improved
so that electricity generated during off-peak times can be
used during peaks. Demand-response programs can lower
demand during traditional peak times. Improved transmission lines and “smart grid” techniques allow electricity to
be furnished from more distant locations where, for example, the wind may be blowing. Information technologies
allow better balancing of supply and demand, especially
over large areas, calling on various resources to take up the
slack left by a lack of wind or sun. New meteorological
techniques can improve wind prediction, allowing adjustments to be made in advance. If all else fails, the power
lost because of darkness or still winds can be made up by
backup fossil fuel generators, ideally with carbon capture
and sequestration (CCS).229

B.

Subsidies and Incentives

Between 2008 and 2015, the average cost of building capacity for land-based wind in the United States
decreased by 41%, that of distributed PV by 54%, and
that of utility-scale PV by 64%.230 Though the plummeting costs of renewables, especially PV, are changing the
situation, renewables have typically been more expensive
than conventional fossil fuel sources, and subsidies or other
incentives or requirements are necessary to induce the construction of new renewable capacity. Once built, however,
renewables benefit from the absence of fuel costs and of
their attendant volatility.

C.

Land Allocation

The impacts of climate change, and efforts to fight it, will
lead to several massive demands for land in addition to the
siting of large wind and solar projects and associated transmission lines:
• The growing of bioenergy crops as a substitute for
fossil fuels.
• The growing of crops for bioenergy CCS as a way of
removing carbon dioxide from the air.
• The loss of habitable or arable land due to sea-level
rise and drought, and the relocation of activities from
that land to other locations.
• The set-aside of large areas of land, as some have
proposed, for habitat for species that are threatened
229. For additional information on the challenges of integrating renewables
into the grid, see International Energy Agency & Clean Energy
Ministerial, Next Generation Wind and Solar Power: From Cost to
Value (2016) [hereinafter Next Generation Wind and Solar Power].
230. DOE, Revolution . . . Now: The Future Arrives for Five Clean Energy
Technologies—2016 Update 1 (2016). See also Next Generation Wind
and Solar Power, supra note 229, at 6; Mark Bolinger & Joachim Seel,
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Utility-Scale Solar 2015:
An Empirical Analysis of Project Cost, Performance, and Pricing
Trends in the United States (2016).
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by climate change and all manner of other humancaused threats.231
On top of this are globally massive demands for
land to grow food for rising populations, and especially land to grow feed for animals to be consumed by
the increasingly affluent residents of some developing
countries, chiefly China. This is leading to many largescale land acquisitions.232
Some land can simultaneously be used for several purposes. For example, the piers for wind turbines occupy very
little land, and farming can continue below and around
the turbines. As discussed below, solar panels can be put
on buildings and on contaminated and otherwise unusable
land. However, solar farms in a desert occupy most of the
land under their large footprints.
No procedure or institution is in place, either domestically or globally, to balance these competing uses for
large quantities of land. The federal government employs
a variety of management approaches to address competing use demands for its large landholdings, with mixed
results.233 In December 2016, BLM adopted what it called
the Planning 2.0 rule to facilitate large-scale planning of
its immense landholdings in the western states,234 but in
March 2017, President Trump signed a bill adopted under
the Congressional Review Act repealing this rule.235 With
the exception of the western states, however, states, local
governments, and private parties are the principal landowners and there are few resources or inclinations by those
entities to look more broadly at regional or national needs
for land. We have an ungoverned patchwork that is not
well-suited to deal with the unfortunate fact that wind and
solar require much more land than fossil fuel or nuclear

231. See Edward O. Wilson, Half-Earth: Our Planet’s Fight for Life
(2016).
232. Suzanne Verhoog, The Global Land Rush Revisited—A Brief Analysis Based
on Data From the Land Matrix in Current Dynamic and Complex Climate &
Land Governance Discourse (2016).
233. See Hayes, supra note 37, at 40.
234. 81 Fed. Reg. 89580 (Dec. 12, 2016), adopting 40 C.F.R. pt. 1600.
235. Kellie Lunney, Trump Signs Resolution Repealing BLM Planning 2.0 Rule,
E&E News, Mar. 27, 2017.
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energy per unit of energy produced, though much less
than biofuels.236
Prof. Uma Outka has identified five policy objectives
for addressing and reducing the cumulative impacts of the
demands for land created by renewable energy.237 All five,
listed in her order of priority, are:
1.	 Avoid new infrastructure/new land impacts (which
can be advanced by energy-efficiency measures that
reduce the need for new energy infrastructure).
2.	 Reuse land that has already been developed or otherwise disturbed.
3.	 Maximize land-efficient onsite and local energy
potential.
4.	 Identify early the least-harm sites for energy projects and strengthen mitigation measures for facilities we need.
5.	 Link transmission planning and renewable energy
policy more closely.

VIII. Conclusion
The task of building the enormous number of new utility-scale renewable energy facilities required to meet the
DDPP goals is daunting indeed. It will require strong
and unyielding commitment by the federal government
and the states, and willingness to recognize the tradeoffs
involved in selectively relaxing some cherished regulatory
restrictions on new construction that have been shown to
interfere with the construction efforts that are essential to
prevent the worst impacts of climate change.

236. Robert I. McDonald et al., Energy Sprawl or Energy Efficiency: Climate Policy
Impacts on Natural Habitat for the United States of America, 4 PLoS ONE 1
(2009); David Malakoff, New Energy Facilities Will Leave Massive Footprint
on U.S., Study Concludes, Sci. Insider, July 18, 2014.
237. Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 241,
297 (2011).
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